The Law Reform Commission of British Columbia was established by the *Law Reform Commission Act* in 1969 and began functioning in 1970.

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TO THE HONOURABLE COLIN GABELMANN
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE PROVINCE OF BRITISH COLUMBIA:

The Law Reform Commission of British Columbia has the honour to present the following:

REPORT ON
WRONGFUL INTERFERENCES WITH GOODS

Late 19th century reforms rationalized civil procedure and in so doing simplified large portions of the law. Various rights and remedies once regarded as separate and distinct matters of law were consolidated and through this process were refined, simplified and made to operate more efficiently. But some aspects of the law escaped these reforms and still bear the mark of antique notions of civil procedure. These unaltered areas of the law are more technical and complex than they need to be and lead to doubt and confusion about legal rights and methods of seeking a just resolution of disputes.

The Commission touched on one part of this problem a number of years ago in Report on the Replevin Act (LRC 38, 1978). The recommendations for modernization were speedily adopted.

The old remedies of conversion and detinue, essentially untouched by the 19th century reforms, are part of another area of the law seriously in need of attention. The relief to which a claimant is entitled, under these ancient remedies, can vary significantly depending on the facts in issue. Situations that are functionally similar can end up being treated quite differently.

This Report recommends changes to the law that will rationalize and put on a modern footing the remedies available to parties where there has been a wrongful interference with personal property. The approach recommended is to replace the older remedies with a new statutory remedy giving the courts flexibility to tailor relief to the needs of the case before them, uninhibited by limitations that were shaped by historical considerations that for some time now have lost their relevance.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

A. Personal Property

Two separate streams of law, developed over the centuries, protect property rights. Personal property, for many reasons, is treated differently from land. (The phrase “personal property” is usually used to mean all property other than land, or property affixed to land.)

The legal framework of rights and remedies relating to personal property is comprehensive. Parts of the law developed by analogy to the law of real property, but much of it is unique.

B. The Common Law Actions

Several actions provide remedies for wrongs relating to personal property. These actions have obscure names, reflecting their antiquity. The main ones are conversion (sometimes called trover), detinue and trespass to chattels. Related actions provide remedies in special circumstances.

Even a brief look finds unexpected levels of legal complexity, the necessity for which may be questioned. How well is the law working? This Report addresses these and other questions to decide whether the law needs to be changed.

Chapter II is a straightforward description and examination of the legal policy of this part of the law. In this form, the discussion, like that in many texts, describes a complicated, highly technical set of legal principles but, because it accepts these principles at face value, does not really give an idea of how strange they are from a modern perspective. Even so, when reviewing Chapter II the reader should continually keep in mind the question: What modern policies are served by these legal principles and the many subtle distinctions to which they lead?

1 Land and property affixed to land are usually referred to as “real property.” The labels, “real” and “personal” refer to the kinds of remedies the law makes available. Interests in land, in the eyes of the law, differ fundamentally from interests in other property. A “real” action provides a “real remedy - the recovery of the property itself. In contrast, wrongs relating to personal property are addressed in proceedings described as “personal actions,” since the remedy provided is enforced against a person, (usually requiring the payment of damages) as opposed to the recovery of the property.

2 Our work in this area owes a great deal to the work of two other law reform agencies who have reported or published research in this field: The (English) Law Reform Committee’s Eighteenth Report (Conversion and Detinue) led to the enactment of the Tort (Interference With Goods) Act, 1977. The Act is set out in an Appendix to this Report. The Ontario Law Reform Commission published a Study Paper on Wrongful Interference With Goods (1989), prepared by Ralph L. Simmonds and George R. Steward with David P. Paciocco. The legislation recommended in the Study Paper is also set out in an Appendix to this Report. For convenience, we refer to these documents as, respectively, the “English Report” and the “OLRC Study Paper.” There is little else in the legal literature dealing with the common law torts protecting rights in personal property that has comprehensively considered directions for revising the law. This Report has built on, and owes a heavy debt to, these ground breaking works. After the Working Paper was published, we had access to the Ninety-Fifth Report of the Law Reform Committee of South Australia on the Law of Detinue, Conversion and Trespass to Goods (1987) and benefited as well as by their detailed consideration of this area of the law.
Chapter III explores the historical forces that have shaped the common law torts dealing with personal property. It quickly becomes clear that, because this part of modern law is riddled with useless anachronisms, some measure of legal reform is called for. The need for reform is discussed in Chapter IV.

C. The Working Paper

A Working Paper preceded this Report. It was circulated widely and advice and criticism was invited on various options for the reform of this area of the law. Responses to the Working Paper will be referred to in Chapter V, which sets out the Commission’s final conclusions for revising the laws relating to wrongful interference with personal property.
CHAPTER II
THE COMMON LAW ACTIONS

A. Introduction

Activities interfering with property rights fall into three general categories. They may involve damage to the property itself. They may affect ownership. Lastly, they may interfere with possession.

Familiar examples recur through the cases. Property is sold and then recovered when the buyer doesn’t pay. A friend or business partner refuses to return borrowed property. An employee uses company property for personal purposes. Someone unknowingly sells or buys stolen property. A person cuts down trees or extracts minerals from another’s property, sometimes intentionally, sometimes by mistake over property lines or claims. A creditor takes too much property to satisfy a debt. A secured creditor takes property that is not subject to the security or improperly appoints a receiver. A repairer refuses to return property until paid for services. A tenant, or a borrower under a mortgage, removes fixtures. A landlord seizes a tenant’s property. A courier loses or damages property, or delivers it to the wrong person. An unpaid employee takes company assets. A stock broker refuses to return the client’s stocks or sells them without proper authority or at the

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In all of these cases, the law must assess loss while untangling rights of ownership and possession. The tools it uses are centuries old, originally fashioned in an entirely different social and economic setting, although they have been modified over the years. These tools are the common law actions of detinue, trespass to chattels, conversion and some other, unnamed torts.

The structure of the law itself is flawed but, before our discussion can properly deal with that subject, it is necessary to canvas briefly the principle features of the common law actions and the underlying policies they advance. It would be possible to devote many more pages to the intricacies of this area of the law, although such a discussion would not further advance the case for reform.

B. The Common Law Actions

Detinue (derived from an Old French word meaning “to detain”) provides a remedy where a person wrongfully refuses a request to return property.

Trespass to chattels is analogous to trespass to land. It provides a remedy where a person wrongfully takes or damages another’s property.

Conversion (also known as “trover”) deals with more serious kinds of interference with property, although it overlaps the other two actions. Conversion provides a remedy where property is destroyed, or wrongfully “converted,” to the use of another.

The other miscellaneous actions fill in gaps. An owner without an immediate right to possession, someone who has leased property to another for example, can’t use the above actions. If a leased car is damaged, the owner must bring one of the unnamed actions (for “damage to the reversionary interest”). Not all of the actions deal with damage caused by an indirect act.

Technically, another unnamed action must be brought to recover compensation for damage or loss...
caused by an indirect act.\(^\text{18}\)

Even this brief introduction suggests some of the law’s complexity. At least five different actions are required to provide appropriate remedies. Why does the law need so many different, interlocking actions to provide remedies when someone wrongfully interferes with property belonging to another?

C. Some Examples

The next section considers in some detail the features of the common law actions. First, however, here are a few examples of issues that can arise and how the law deals with them. Is it possible to discern from the examples reasons for these legal distinctions?\(^\text{19}\)

\(i\). I feed your horse poisoned oats. The horse gets sick for a few hours. I am liable in trespass.

\(ii\). I feed your horse poisoned oats. The horse gets sick for a month. I am liable in either conversion or trespass. In conversion, I must pay the whole value of the horse. In trespass, damages will be assessed as your losses.

\(iii\). I leave poisoned oats on the ground. Your horse eats them and gets sick for a few hours. This is not trespass. It is an (unnamed) action on the case.

\(^{18}\) The law refers to each of the unnamed actions as an action “on the case.” Until the latter part of the nineteenth century, each cause of action had a separate writ. A writ is a document used to begin an action. “Detinue,” “trespass to chattels” and “trover” are the names of the writs by which these actions were originally brought forward. Where no specific writ addressed the loss suffered, the plaintiff could sometimes start the action with a generic writ, “on the case.” The plaintiff would use this writ to set out in detail the wrong complained of and the court would consider whether it could grant a remedy even in the absence of a specific writ for the wrong. The distinction was causal. If the damage was “direct” then the writ of trespass was available. If “indirect,” then one had to resort to the writ of “action on the case.” This dichotomy has been illustrated as follows (in *Leame v. Bray*, (1803) 3 East 593, 602, 102 E.R. 724, *per* Le Blanc J., referring to *Reynolds v. Clarke*, (1725) 1 Str. 634, 636, 93 E.R. 747):

And the distinction is well instanced by the example put of a man throwing a log into the highway: if at the time of its being thrown it hit any person, it is trespass; but if after it be thrown, any person going along the road receive an injury by falling over it as it lies there, it is a case. Neither does the degree of violence with which the act is done make any difference: for if the log were put down in the most quiet way upon a man’s foot it is trespass; but if thrown onto the road with whatever violence, and one afterwards falls over it, it is case and not trespass.

The common law used the action on the case to work out a number of concepts such as distinctions between willful and negligent acts, and direct and indirect consequences of actions. The law of negligence springs from the action on the case. Chapter III discusses the action on the case in greater detail.

\(^{19}\) Part of this list is based on a similar exercise set out in the American Law Institute, *Restatement of the Law. Torts* (2d), Ch. 9, 433-6. In some cases, the classification of the particular wrong may be a matter of debate and, in a review of several hundred years of cases, it is possible to locate inconsistent findings on similar fact patterns. Quibbles over classification only underscore the extent to which fine and not always necessary distinctions are drawn by the law.
iv. You loan me your horse, but I won’t return it when you ask. I am liable in detinue.

v. You loan me your horse. I loan it to Fred. I can’t return it when you ask. I am not liable in detinue. I may be liable in trespass or conversion.

vi. I take your horse without your permission, and won’t return it when you ask. I am liable in trespass and, possibly, conversion.

vii. I take your horse without your permission, and won’t return it when you ask. I also ride it. I am liable in conversion.

viii. You loan Fred your horse. Fred asks me to take care of it. You ask for it back. I say I must first check with Fred. I have committed no wrong.

ix. Fred takes your horse without permission and asks me to take care of it. I do not know of Fred’s wrong. You ask for it back. I say I must first check with Fred. I am liable in conversion.

x. Fred takes your horse without permission and asks my boss to take care of it (which means I take care of it). You ask for it back. I say I must first check with my boss. I have committed no wrong.

xi. You ask for your horse back and I refuse without telling you why (but I want to check with my boss first). I am liable in conversion.

xii. I repair your piano and bring it back to you. It’s still in the truck when you tell me you can’t pay for it. I take it back to the shop. I have committed no wrong.

xiii. I repair your piano and bring it back to you. I transport it to your living room and uncrate it and you tell me you can’t pay for it. I repack it and put it back on the truck. I am liable in either trespass or conversion.

xiv. You lease your house to Fred. I cut down bushes around the house without permission. Fred can sue me for conversion, but you can’t. You can sue me in case, for injury to the reversionary interest.

xv. You lease your house to Fred. I cut down trees on the property without permission. You can sue me in conversion. Fred cannot.

xvi. You leave your coat with me, and I cut it into pieces. I am liable in conversion.

xvii. I hide your coat. Moths get at it, ruining it. I am liable in conversion.

xviii. You leave your coat with me. Moths get at it, ruining it. I refuse to return it. I am liable in detinue.
xix. Same as xviii, but I return it. I am liable in an action on the case.

xx. You leave your coat with me. I refuse to return it. (I have lost it, but you don’t know that). I am liable in detinue.

xxi. You leave your coat with me. I refuse to return it because I have lost it (which you know). I am liable in conversion.

xxii. I take your coat without your permission and give it to Fred. I am liable in trespass. Fred is liable in conversion or detinue.

xxiii. I take your coat without your permission and purport to sell it to Fred (who believes that it is my coat). I am liable in conversion. Fred is guilty of conversion as well.

xxiv. I take your coat without your permission and hire Fred to deliver it to Tom. All three of us are liable in conversion.

xxv. I borrow your car. Fred throws a rock at it, damaging it. You and I both can sue Fred for trespass to chattels. You can sue Fred for conversion.

xxvi. Same as xxv, except I have the car under a six month lease. I can sue Fred for trespass to chattels. You can’t sue Fred for trespass or conversion, but you can sue him in an action on the case.

xxvii. Fred steals your car. I buy it from Fred, not knowing it is stolen. I leave it with Tom for repairs. Arthur thinks it is collateral for a bad loan and repossesses it. You can sue Fred and me for conversion. I can sue Arthur for trespass to chattels (even though, because it is a stolen car, I have no title to it).

The examples reveal little about the law, but they highlight the many distinctions that the law makes. Few of these distinctions are made for obvious reasons. Some distinctions drawn by the law are remnants of the legal pettifogging that was the embarrassment of the nineteenth century. In one way or another, however, even if the route is not clear, it appears that the law usually provides an appropriate remedy.

D. Features of the Principal Common Law Actions

This section examines the common law actions in more detail. Categorizing distinctions the law draws, and identifying reasons for them, should reveal the policies being advanced by the law. At issue is whether these policy objectives remain valid today. Each of the common law actions must face the same general questions:

Who is entitled to sue?

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Who should be sued?

When can an action be brought? (When should a wrong require a legal remedy, or what wrongs should do so?) and

What is an appropriate remedy?

The common law ordinarily irons out inconsistencies, so legal principles operate in harmony. Surprisingly, that has not happened here. The answers to these questions differ from action to action.

The actions share at least one feature in common: each deals with harm that arises “intentionally” in contrast to harm that arises negligently or inadvertently. That is not to say that the wrongdoer must have “intended” to interfere with a person’s rights of ownership or possession. Conduct may be innocent, carried out under the honest but mistaken belief, for example, that the wrongdoer owns the goods, but that will not be a defence. The intentional element refers to the act causing the harm. Moreover, once having intermeddled, the wrongdoer will be responsible for any further harm, even if it is out of the wrongdoer’s control (such as in example xvii above, where the moths ruin the coat).

1. DETINUE
   
   (a) Generally

   A person who, without justification, refuses to return property upon the request of a person

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entitled to it will be liable in detinue.

Sometimes a holder need not return property, at least not immediately. Suppose, for example, the holder rents the property and the lease is still in good standing. Refusing to return rented property is not detinue. The holder has every right to continue to enjoy the property until the lease ends. Similarly, the holder may take a reasonable time to discover whether the requester has any right to the property. A qualified refusal to return property, consequently, is not usually detinue.

Only detinue allows the court to order the return of property. In 1854, however, England enacted legislation empowering the courts to order the return of property, apparently in any action involving detained property:

British Columbia incorporated this section in the Rules of Court as Rule 42(18), but introduced a subtle and possibly significant change. The Rule does not empower the court to order the return

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24 Actual possession may not be a sufficient interest to support a claim for the return of property. E.g., B owns the property. B loans it to C. D takes it from C. C had possession, but not necessarily an immediate right to possession. The action for recovery of the property should probably be brought by B, the owner, although C may be able to sue since a person with custody is presumed to have a right to immediate possession: Study Paper at 16, n. 7; see also Russell v. Wilson, (1923-4) 33 C.L.R. 538. The law uses the word “possession” in a special sense. Sometimes a person without custody of the property will still have possession. The law regards a person whose possession is interrupted, by parking a car, as remaining in possession of it. In a few cases, a person with custody of property is not considered to have possession. The law recognizes vicarious possession. An employee, e.g., holds property for the employer. The employer has possession of it.

25 It doesn’t matter how the holder obtained the property. In Russell v. Wilson, ibid., the police seized money in a raid on a betting parlour. The bookmaker successfully sued to recover the money in detinue. See also Chief Constable of the West Midlands Police v. White, (1992) 136 Sol. J. 93; A.G. (Canada) v. Brock, [1991] B.C.D. Civ. 3874-01 (S.C.). The action is used typically to regulate relations between an owner and another who holds the property. The receiver is called a “bailee” and the relationship is referred to as “bailment.” Bailment is an area of the law rich with distinctions and technicality. Parts of this area of the law are regulated by state: see, e.g., Warehouse Receipt Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c.428; Warehouse Lien Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c.427; Mansfield Importers Ltd. v. Casco Terminals Ltd., (1970) 14 D.L.R. (3d) 358 (B.C.S.C.); Hogarth v. Archibald Moving & Storage, (1991) 57 B.C.L.R. 319 (S.C.); Katzel v. Tolo Enterprises, [1991] B.C.D. Civ. 504-01 (S.C.); Ladha v. Korres Moving & Transfer Ltd., [1991] B.C.D. Civ. 504-03 (S.C.). Rights and obligations vary depending on how the bailment arises, and whether the bailee is paid to look after the property. Some say the only area where conversion has not entirely replaced detinue is where a bailee negligently or accidentally loses goods or allows them to be destroyed: see, e.g., English Report, 4. Conversion does not apply because of the requirement for an intentional act. Even so, there seem to be other cases where the two torts do not entirely overlap. For example, B refuses to return A’s property. Cases hold that if B’s refusal is not an interference with A’s dominion, in the sense that B denies As title or converts the goods to B’s own use, it is not conversion and can only be detinue. Suppose B will not return the goods until A pays money owed on another matter. That is probably detinue, not conversion. If B uses the goods in the meantime, however, it is conversion: Heiseler v. Connors, (1911) 10 E.L.R. 61 (N.S.S.C.).

26 Common Law Procedure Act, 1854, 17 & 18 Vict. c.125, s.78.

27 The section corrected a defect in the common law that allowed the wrongdoer the option of returning the goods or paying damages instead. The option occasionally produced injustice. See further, infra, n. 74.

Ward v. Macauley, (1791) 4 T.R. 489. Discussions of the law in this context are sometimes misleading. The law may consider a person to have possession even where the property is physically in the hands of another and, it seems, an owner who can call for possession of the property at will may bring an action in trespass. This is an issue upon which there has been much debate. Halsbury’s first edition sets out that a person with possession or an immediate right to possession may bring an action in trespass, and Southin J.A. accepts this position in London Drugs Limited, supra, n. 21. Others, (among them, Holdsworth, A History of the English Law (2d) vol. 7, 422-4, and Pollock and Wright, An Essay on Possession in the Common Law (1888) 145-6) are clear that trespass is only of property. It provides that where the court can make such an order, it need not give the wrongdoer the option of paying damages. Possibly the Rule operates only when the conditions necessary to support the action of detinue are present. Compare the rule with the legislation set out above:

Rule 42(18) Where it is sought to enforce an order for the recovery of property other than land or money by writ of delivery, upon the application of the judgment holder, the court may order that execution issue for the delivery of the property without giving the other party the option of retaining the property upon paying the assessed value ...

The law of British Columbia retains much of the ancient learning associated with detinue, but even the name is inappropriate today. It is an example of legal jargon. At the very least, the action should be renamed. Other jurisdictions see no need for the action at all. England abolished it in 1977.28

(b) Summary

It is useful to summarize the discussion according to the four questions raised at the beginning of this section. This summary will help later in comparing policy between the common law actions:

1. **Who may sue?** A person entitled to the possession of the property (not necessarily the owner of the goods).

2. **Who is liable?** A person with possession of goods who refuses without qualification a request to return them to the person entitled to possession.

3. **What is the wrong?** Interference with possession (not damage to the goods, or interference with ownership).

4. **What is the remedy?** An order for the return of the goods, or an award of damages.

2. TRESPASS TO CHATTELS

(a) Generally

A person who wrongfully takes or damages property is liable for trespass to chattels. The person who had possession when the wrong occurred may sue the wrongdoer for damages. The action is available only to the possessor. An owner who has given possession to someone else may not recover damages for the trespass.29

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29 Ward v. Macauley, (1791) 4 T.R. 489. Discussions of the law in this context are sometimes misleading. The law may consider a person to have possession even where the property is physically in the hands of another and, it seems, an owner who can call for possession of the property at will may bring an action in trespass. This is an issue upon which there has been much debate. Halsbury’s first edition sets out that a person with possession or an immediate right to possession may bring an action in trespass, and Southin J.A. accepts this position in London Drugs Limited, supra, n. 21. Others, (among them, Holdsworth, A History of the English Law (2d) vol. 7, 422-4, and Pollock and Wright, An Essay on Possession in the Common Law (1888) 145-6) are clear that trespass is only
available to a person with possession, although there is some exceptions where the holder holds on behalf of the owner. Debates of this kind are a reflection of complexities inherited from a developing legal system. Fleming, supra, n. 21 at 49, e.g., explains the inconsistency (the idea of using vicarious possession to extend the ambit of trespass to chattels) arose solely because trover was insufficiently developed at the time. In the end these debates serve only historical purposes to aid in an understanding of the distinctions once drawn between various kinds of actions. Even if the owner is not considered to have an immediate right of possession and therefore may not sue for the trespass to chattels, the owner has a remedy. The tort of conversion may provide the owner with a right to damages and, if not, there are other actions. Modern cases do not always distinguish between trespass to chattels and other analogous actions. Salmond, The Law of Torts (6th ed., 1924) 412 says: “... and we need not scruple at the present day to term such an injury to reversionary rights a trespass, although the remedy under the old practice was not trespass but case.” Seventy years after this comment, however, the law still from time to time tends to scruple over these classifications. Two contradictory forces blur the legal position. One force emphasizes the common principles of the law and blends them in a synthesis, in this way both refining and simplifying the law. The other emphasizes the technical distinctions, even where they no longer hold any contemporary relevance or utility. By the 8th edition of Salmond, the comment has been removed.

Trespass requires a direct interference with the goods (although there is no requirement that the trespasser come into contact with the goods). Indirect interference is not trespass. As with much of this part of the common law, a proposition like this must be instantly qualified. While indirect interference is not trespass, a related, unnamed tort provides a remedy.

(b) Summary

Returning to the four questions raised in the preface to this section:

1. **Who may sue for trespass to chattels?** A person in possession of the property (not necessarily the owner of the goods).

2. **Who is liable?** A person who wrongfully damages or interferes with goods in the possession of another.

3. **What is the wrong?** Interference with possession or causing damage to the goods (but not interference with ownership).

4. **What is the remedy?** At common law, the wrongdoer had to pay damages measured by

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31 See, e.g., McLachlan v. C.I.B.C., [1989] 4 W.W.R 341 (B.C.C.A.). There is some debate concerning whether an action lies where there is no loss. Trespass originally served functions usually associated with criminal law, to keep the peace. Fleming, supra, n. 21 at 48, suggests that an unwarranted intrusion, harmless but placing something of value in jeopardy, would probably be actionable. An owner of valuable and fragile property, such as art on display in a museum, should be allowed, e.g., to forbid people from touching it.

32 Fleming, *ibid.*, at 57.
Now legislation also allows the courts to compel the return of property still held by the wrongdoer. The wrongdoer, however, need not intend to interfere with another’s rights of possession or ownership. E.g., the assertion of dominion may be innocent if honestly based upon the belief the wrongdoer owns the goods. Even so, the wrong will qualify as conversion: Reinholz v. Cornell & Gaar Scott & Co., (1909) 2 Sask. L.R. 342 (S.C.); T.D. Bank v. Dearborn Motors, (1968) 64 W.W.R. 577 (B.C.S.C.); cf. Solloway v. Blumberger, [1933] S.C.R. 163.

Usually, the sale must be completed by delivery before it is considered to be conversion. Wrongfully selling property, or delivering it to another who obtains a lien over it - for repairs, e.g. - is conversion but, apparently, pledging the property is not: Spackman v. Foster, (1883) 11 Q.B.C. 99, an anomaly that England has corrected in legislation: Tort (Interference with Goods) Act 1977, s.11(2); see also OLRC Study Paper at 21.

Oakley v. Lyster, [1931 1 K.B. 148, 150, [1930] All E.R. rep. 234 (C.A.), although it has been suggested that the position is not supported by authority: English Report at 16.

The interference must be serious, and must interfere with the claimant’s rights of dominion: see, e.g., Fouldes v. Willoughby, (1841) 8 M. & W. 540, 151 E.R. 1153, which involved a ferry operator who, dealing with a troublesome passenger, put the passenger’s horses off the ferry.

33 Now legislation also allows the courts to compel the return of property still held by the wrongdoer.

34 The wrongdoer, however, need not intend to interfere with another’s rights of possession or ownership. E.g., the assertion of dominion may be innocent if honestly based upon the belief the wrongdoer owns the goods. Even so, the wrong will qualify as conversion: Reinholz v. Cornell & Gaar Scott & Co., (1909) 2 Sask. L.R. 342 (S.C.); T.D. Bank v. Dearborn Motors, (1968) 64 W.W.R. 577 (B.C.S.C.); cf. Solloway v. Blumberger, [1933] S.C.R. 163.

35 Usually, the sale must be completed by delivery before it is considered to be conversion. Wrongfully selling property, or delivering it to another who obtains a lien over it - for repairs, e.g. - is conversion but, apparently, pledging the property is not: Spackman v. Foster, (1883) 11 Q.B.C. 99, an anomaly that England has corrected in legislation: Tort (Interference with Goods) Act 1977, s.11(2); see also OLRC Study Paper at 21.

36 Oakley v. Lyster, [1931 1 K.B. 148, 150, [1930] All E.R. rep. 234 (C.A.), although it has been suggested that the position is not supported by authority: English Report at 16.

37 The interference must be serious, and must interfere with the claimant’s rights of dominion: see, e.g., Fouldes v. Willoughby, (1841) 8 M. & W. 540, 151 E.R. 1153, which involved a ferry operator who, dealing with a troublesome passenger, put the passenger’s horses off the ferry.
existing among the major common law actions that protect rights in personal property. The same activities by a wrongdoer might support a claim under two or more of these headings. For example, B damages property owned by C. The remedy available to C depends upon the severity of the damage. Minor damage entitles C to damages for trespass to chattels. If the damage is substantial, however, B’s actions are considered to interfere with C’s rights of dominion, and the remedy will be in conversion. Fleming describes the tort as follows:

Conversion may be defined as an intentional exercise of control over a chattel which so seriously interferes with the right of another to control it that the intermeddler may justly be required to pay its full value. Characteristic of this tort is that the ordinary measure of damages is the full value of the chattel. In truth, the action is proprietary in substance, only tortious in form. As has been perceptively observed, the action in effect forces an involuntary purchase on the converter; it permits the plaintiff to say to him: ‘You have bought yourself something.’

In the example, it does not advance matters very much to say that B’s actions in one case interfere with another’s dominion over the chattel, while in the other they do not. The analysis depends upon a fiction since, in each case, B has done exactly the same thing for exactly the same reason.

In some cases of conversion, an interference with another’s rights of dominion unmistakably lies at the heart of the action. B refuses to return C’s yacht, for example, until C pays an outstanding debt. B keeps the yacht safely moored. This is detinue. B has interfered only with C’s rights of possession. If B uses the yacht for B’s own purposes, it becomes conversion. Personal use interferes with the owner’s dominion over the property. In detinue, C could recover the yacht and damages for its wrongful detention. In conversion, however, C could recover the whole of the value of the yacht, forcing B to buy it.

(c) Who May Sue?

The action protects dominion. Dominion is not the same thing as ownership. The action is available to someone with possession when the wrong occurred (in this way, the action is like trespass to chattels or detinue). Even a person without possession can bring the action, if entitled to call for possession (in this way, the action is like detinue).
same position is true where the owner gives security to another, unless the documents reserve the owner’s possessory rights, even if the owner has actual possession: *Ruttan v. Beamish*, (1860) 10 U.C.C.P 90; *McAulay v. Allen*, (1870) 20 U.C.C.P 417 (C.A.); *Samuel v. Coulter*, (1877) 28 U.C.C.P 240 (C.A.); *sede also McCrary v. McCrary*, (1863) 22 U.C.Q.B. 520 (C.A.); cf. *McLeod v. Mercer*, (1856) 6 U.C.C.P. 197. In contrast, if A merely loans the car to B, A can demand its return any time and, therefore, can sue in conversion. The wrong itself might end the arrangement, restoring an owner’s possessory rights: *Sibley v. Sibley*, (1871) 8 N.S.R. 324 (C.A.); cf. *Cornish v. Niagara Dist. Bank*, (1874) 24 U.C.C.P 262 (C.A.). Some people, such as a trustee in bankruptcy or a personal representative of a deceased person, have rights that relate back and may be able to bring an action for a wrong committed before they are empowered to call for possession. Some cases suggest that to be successful, a claimant who has possessory rights must also have a right of property. It has been explained, however, that a person with a right of possession has by definition a sufficient right of property: see, e.g., *Sandford v. Bowles*, (1873) 9 N.S.R. 304 (C.A.). Much of the law relating to possession reflects principles developed before notions of property and possession were fully worked out. See OLRC Study Paper at 25, discussing a possible distinction between rights of immediate possession: the issue is whether a right of immediate possession sufficient to support conversion would also support an action in detinue. See, e.g., example xvii above.

Where a person comes wrongfully into possession of the property, however, damage arising from nonfeasance might lift the wrong from detinue to conversion. See, e.g., example xvii above. See Holdsworth, *supra*, n. 29 at 407. The English legislation abolishing the action of detinue recasts conversion to provide a remedy for harm caused to goods through nonfeasance. See *Tort (interference with Goods) Act* 1977, s.2(3).

Another interesting difference between conversion and detinue lies in how property is to be described to support a claim for damages. The standards are higher were the claim is in detinue: *Mills v. King*, (1864) 14 U.C.C.P. 233, 3 E. & A. 120. That is because in detinue the goods themselves must be recovered. This is an example of the law drawing a legal distinction for no surviving purpose. Any rationale for the distinction vanished after the enactment of legislation allowing the goods themselves to also be recovered in conversion.


**d) Misfeasance and Nonfeasance**

Conversion developed later than both detinue and trespass to chattels. Eventually, it almost entirely replaced the need for either of the earlier actions. In only a very few situations does trespass to chattels or detinue provide a remedy where conversion does not.

One instance arises from a distinction drawn by the law between wrongs occurring by positive actions (misfeasance) and wrongs occurring passively (nonfeasance). Suppose B holds A’s property (as a bailee). If B delivers it by mistake to C, A will be entitled to damages in conversion. B’s positive acts qualify as misfeasance. On the other hand, if the property is damaged through a failure to act, conversion will not provide a remedy, although A might receive compensation in an action in detinue, negligence or breach of contract.

**e) What Kinds of Property May Be Converted?**

Conversion protects tangible personal property, including documents evidencing rights, such as documents of title, negotiable instruments, guarantees, insurance policies and bonds. The action
Equity, however, will grant a lien to protect a person whose money is taken:

Merchants Express Co. v. Morton, 15 Gr. 274 (1868). Is there any reason why a statutory tort should not protect money? Modern cases certainly speak of conversion of money: see, e.g., Goss (Guardian ad Litem) v. Woodward, 3 C.B. (N.S.) 798 (1859); Trusts & Guarantee Co. v. Brenner, [1933] S.C.R. 656. The rule applies whether the value of the property increases or decreases after the conversion: Rhodes v. Moules, [1895] 1 Ch. 236, 254. In contrast, damages in detinue are determined at the date of trial because they are a substitute for the return of the property: see supra, n. 45; see also, e.g., General & Finance Facilities Ltd. v. Cooks Cars (Romford) Ltd., [1963] 1 W.L.R. 644 (C.A.); Cash v. Georgia Pacific Securities Corp., [1990] B.C.C. 17 W.W.R. 239 (B.C.S.C.). In some cases, the court has valued property as of the date the conversion is discovered: see Sachs v. Miklos, [1948] 2 K.B. 23 (C.A.), but the Court of Appeal in Malhotra v. Choudhury, [1980] Ch. 52, 79 criticized the case as adopting a position that was unnecessary, too wide and based on a headnote that incorrectly summarized another case. In the view of the English Court of Appeal in Choudhury, damages for conversion must be assessed at the date of conversion. See also The Queen v. Arnold, [1971] S.C.R. 209. In IBL v. Coussens, (1990) Times, 16 July (C.A.) C refused to return the plaintiff’s vehicles (an Aston-Martin and a Rolls Royce). At the date of conversion they were worth £62,000. By the time of trial they were worth a good deal more than that. The Court of Appeal selected the trial date to value the vehicles.

The amount the wrongdoer receives for the goods may not represent a market value. A low price may have been set to encourage a quick sale: Pathfinder Recreation (Receiver of) v. Borg Warner Acceptance Canada, [1990] B.C.J. No. 686 (S.C.). Some modern cases seem to suggest an inclination to compensate for actual loss rather than an amount arbitrarily determined as the value of the goods. See, e.g., Karup v. Rollins, supra, n. 6.

does not protect money. 47

Fixtures, trees, crops and minerals are regarded as part of the land. Severing them from the land is not conversion. 48 Once severed, however, they are personal property. Any further interference with them is trespass to chattels or conversion. 49

(f) Measure of Damages

(i) Date of Conversion

The rule of thumb is that damages are the value of the goods, calculated at the date of the conversion. 50 The court may also award damages for consequential loss, taking into account changes in value after conversion. 51

The value of the goods is usually determined as either their market value or replacement cost. 52 Even someone who only shares ownership is entitled to damages assessed as the whole of the value

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47 Equity, however, will grant a lien to protect a person whose money is taken: Merchants Express Co. v. Morton, (1868) 15 Gr. 274. Is there any reason why a statutory tort should not protect money? Modern cases certainly speak of conversion of money: see, e.g., Goss (Guardian ad Litem) v. Woodward, [1991] B.C.D. Civ. 2060-01, 3585-08 (C.A.); Gives v. Schneider, (1991) 26 A.C.W.S. (3d) 1061 (Ont. Ct.).


50 Trusts & Guarantee Co. v. Brenner, [1933] S.C.R. 656. The rule applies whether the value of the property increases or decreases after the conversion: Rhodes v. Moules, [1895] 1 Ch. 236, 254. In contrast, damages in detinue are determined at the date of trial because they are a substitute for the return of the property: see supra, n. 45; see also, e.g., General & Finance Facilities Ltd. v. Cooks Cars (Romford) Ltd., [1963] 1 W.L.R. 644 (C.A.); Cash v. Georgia Pacific Securities Corp., [1990] B.C.C. 17 W.W.R. 239 (B.C.S.C.). This is another distinction without any purpose now that legislation allows the courts to order the return of property. In fact, courts have asserted a discretion to award damages calculated at a later time: Curr v. Munro, (1840) 6 O.S. 57 (C.A.); Hogg v. Benito Farmers Elevator Co., [1923] 1 W.W.R. 1303 (Man. C.A.); McCaskill v. Ford Motors Co., Becker Motors (1953) Ltd. and Stanley. (1955) 17 W.W.R. 239 (B.C.S.C.). In some cases, the court has valued property as of the date the conversion is discovered: see Sachs v. Miklos, [1948] 2 K.B. 23 (C.A.), but the Court of Appeal in Malhotra v. Choudhury, [1980] Ch. 52, 79 criticized the case as adopting a position that was unnecessary, too wide and based on a headnote that incorrectly summarized another case. In the view of the English Court of Appeal in Choudhury, damages for conversion must be assessed at the date of conversion. See also The Queen v. Arnold, [1971] S.C.R. 209. In IBL v. Coussens, (1990) Times, 16 July (C.A.) C refused to return the plaintiff’s vehicles (an Aston-Martin and a Rolls Royce). At the date of conversion they were worth £62,000. By the time of trial they were worth a good deal more than that. The Court of Appeal selected the trial date to value the vehicles.

51 Grenn v. Brampton Poultry Co., (1958) 13 D.L.R. (2d) 279, aff’d, 18 D.L.R. (2d) 9 (Ont. C.A.). Damages may also compensate for opportunities lost because the property was not available to the owner: R.F. Fry & Associates (Pacific) Ltd. v. Reimer, supra, n. 13; but not if the owner could not have taken advantage of those opportunities: Nor-Lite Sea Farms Ltd. v. Ellingsen, supra, n. 12.

52 The amount the wrongdoer receives for the goods may not represent a market value. A low price may have been set to encourage a quick sale: Pathfinder Recreation (Receiver of) v. Borg Warner Acceptance Canada, [1990] B.C.J. No. 686 (S.C.). Some modern cases seem to suggest an inclination to compensate for actual loss rather than an amount arbitrarily determined as the value of the goods. See, e.g., Karup v. Rollins, supra, n. 6.
of the goods.\(^{53}\)

The claimant must take steps to limit, or mitigate, losses. This is an important duty when the value of the converted property - such as shares in a company - is subject to fluctuation.\(^{54}\)

The inflexible measure of damages in conversion may be responsible for much of the law’s subtlety. A court might be understandably reluctant to find a person liable in conversion if the damages are out of all proportion to the wrong.\(^{55}\) The method of measuring damages is one of several unusual elements of conversion.\(^{56}\) Few other areas of the law operate quite so arbitrarily.

(ii) Proceeds

Suppose B takes A’s bicycle and sells it to C. C pays $150, but the bicycle is only worth $100. Measuring damages as the value of the goods, A recovers $100, leaving B with a profit of $50.\(^{57}\)

While the common law torts technically do not provide compensation to an owner of the property for profits made by the wrongdoer, compensation may be recoverable in restitution.\(^{58}\)

A vendor usually invests time and money in carrying out a sale. A recurring fact pattern involves logging another’s land or the removal of coal or minerals from another’s mine. Should any

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\(^{53}\) An exception is made where the wrongdoer also has an interest in the property. The plaintiff’s recovery is limited, either to the value of the plaintiff’s interest or, sometimes, the value of the property less the interest of the wrongdoer: *Smith v. Sterling Securities Corp.*, [1933] 3 W.W.R 347 (Sask. C.A.). A typical case involves a secured debt. A lender who wrongfully seizes the security will be liable in conversion, but for what amount? The whole of the value of the property seems an inappropriate standard. The amount of damages is usually the value of the property less the secured debt: see *Fleming*, *supra*, n. 21 at 66.

\(^{54}\) *Asemra Oil Corp. v. Sea Oil & General Corp.*, [1979] 1 S.C.R. 633. A computer assisted search of Canadian jurisprudence dealing with the common law personal property actions showed that during the past decade mitigation is the issue most often addressed in wrongful interference cases.

\(^{55}\) Perhaps *Fouldes v. Willoughby*, *supra*, n. 37, the case which established the modern features of the tort of conversation by clearly differentiating it from trespass, was influenced in part by the fact that damages, assessed by the jury, were the whole of the value of the plaintiff’s lost property.

\(^{56}\) There is some doubt whether this principle has been correctly carried forward. In the nineteenth century, e.g., the cases do not say that the measure of damages in conversion is invariably the full value of the property. They say that a jury may award damages in that amount: see, e.g., *Fouldes*, *supra*, n. 37. But it would be open to a jury to assess damages in any amount.

\(^{57}\) If C can be located, A can recover the bicycle because C is also liable in conversion. The general rule is that a person cannot convey a greater interest than is actually possessed: *nemo dat quod non habet*. There are, however, some cases where the law acknowledges an exception by which a purchaser can obtain good title: see, e.g., *Sale of Goods Act*, R.S.B.C. 1979, c.370, ss.26-30; G. Battersby, “The Sale of Stolen Goods: A Dilemma for the Law,” (1991) 54 Mod. L. Rev. 752.

\(^{58}\) The claimant is said to “waive” the tort. The claimant recovers the benefit received by the wrongdoer on a restitutionary basis as if the owner authorized the transaction and the wrongdoer acted on the owner’s behalf: see *Goff & Jones, The Law of Restitution* (3rd ed., 1986) 605; *Lamine v. Dorrell*, (1701) 2 Ld. Raym. 1216, 92 E.R. 303; *Trusts & Guarantee Co. v. Brenner*, *supra*, n. 50.
allowance be made to the wrongdoer who has spent time and money in carrying out the sale of the timber or minerals? The British Columbia Court of Appeal considered this question in *Shewish v. MacMillan Bloedel Ltd.* The defendant logged native lands. The court held, confirming earlier English and Canadian authority, that the issue turned upon whether the wrongdoer acted innocently. A person who knowingly deals with someone else’s property must account for the full value of the goods, less the cost of bringing the property to market. Where the person acts innocently, however, a “mild” rule for damage assessment applies. Damages will be adjusted by deducting not only the cost of transporting the property to market, but also other expenses incurred in extracting, severing, harvesting or manufacturing the property. An allowance is also made for a person who acts negligently. The reason is the same in each case: the owner could not have profited from the sale without incurring the costs.

The “mild” rule is consistent with general theories of compensation. It is not altogether clear, however, what principles justify the other, “severe” rule for damage assessment, which seems to contain an arbitrarily determined punitive component.

(iii) Nominal Damages

If the wrongdoer returns the property in good condition, the claimant usually recovers (often nominal) damages compensating for the wrongful detention. Recovering property, however, is not always a complete remedy. A recent case, for example, involved a broker who sold a client’s shares and replaced them when prices dropped, pocketing the difference. The court held that the broker should not be allowed to retain the wrongfully gotten proceeds.

(iv) Summary

This concludes the comparison of policies advanced by the major common law actions dealing...
with personal property. To summarize, in terms of the four questions guiding our inquiry:

1. **Who may sue in conversion?** A person entitled to the possession of the property (not necessarily the owner of the goods).

2. **Who is liable?** A person who wrongfully damages or interferes with goods in the possession of another where the damage or interference is substantial.

3. **What is the wrong?** Interference with a person’s dominion over the goods.

4. **What is the remedy?** At common law, the wrongdoer was liable to pay damages measured as the value of the goods at the date of conversion. The law, however, acknowledges many exceptions to the general principle.\(^{64}\)

All three actions protect a person who possesses the property when the wrong occurred.\(^{65}\) Additionally, detinue and conversion protect a person with an immediate right to possession. Each tort serves a principal function that differs from the others. Trespass to chattels provides compensation for damage to, or interference with, property. Detinue provides for the return of property. Conversion deals with serious damage to or interference with property. This analysis, however, emphasizes the distinctions, while ignoring the substantial degree of overlap among the actions. Each, for example, provides a remedy if property is wrongfully detained.\(^{66}\) Trespass to chattels was once the only vehicle for obtaining compensation for serious damage to property. Now conversion also serves that purpose.

It is also useful to list situations where there are gaps in the law, or the results achieved by it are anomalous.\(^{67}\)

(a) A claimant without possession when property is damaged has no remedy under the three torts if the damage is not substantial;\(^{68}\)

(b) A person who keeps goods can be compelled to “buy” them, even in some cases where the retention is for an innocent reason;

(c) A person deprived of goods for a short time through another’s negligence may have no

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\(^{64}\) Now legislation also allows the courts to compel the return of property still held by the wrongdoer.

\(^{65}\) Subject to qualifications referred to earlier. *See supra*, nn. 24-5.

\(^{66}\) Since 1841 (when *Fouldes v. Willoughby* was decided), however, conversion has been unavailable if the wrongdoer does not purport to interfere with an owner’s dominion over the goods. *See examples iv and viii.*

\(^{67}\) This is only a partial list; *see further Gordon, supra*, n. 60.

\(^{68}\) The owner’s remedy is in another branch of case, to protect the “reversionary interest.” If the damage is substantial, the owner has a remedy in conversion.
cause of action.\textsuperscript{69}

(d) Rights and remedies turn on finely drawn distinctions that are out of step with current legal thought.\textsuperscript{70}

(e) Different principles of damage assessment apply, depending on the tort involved. Damages in trespass to chattels are measured as the extent of the loss suffered by the person in possession. Damages in detinue are the value of the goods at the date of trial. Damages in conversion are the value of the goods at the date of the conversion. Damage awards in detinue or conversion may not correspond at all with the plaintiff’s actual losses. Courts over the years, however, have qualified these positions so that results achieved are very often similar.\textsuperscript{71}

(f) Different standards of proof apply depending upon the tort involved. Detinue requires a higher standard of identifying property than trespass to chattels or conversion. This is because detinue is the only common law action that provides for the return of personal property. Nineteenth century legislation, however, allows the court to grant that remedy in any case.

E. Categories of Distinctions Drawn By the Law

Like the examples set out at the beginning of this Chapter, a discussion of the basic principles fails to produce a readily comprehensible picture of the law protecting rights in property. This section attempts to pull together classes of distinctions drawn by the law to see whether the law is advancing necessary or desirable policies.

1. OWNERSHIP AND POSSESSION

The common law protecting personal property deals primarily with possessory rights. It is a focus that is responsible for layers of complexity.

The idea of ownership of property is familiar enough today but it was not when courts first began to construct the legal foundations of the law. The medieval mind recognized that it was necessary to protect possession of property to reduce incidents of civil disorder. It is from this viewpoint that the popular wisdom arose: possession is nine tenths of the law. This much

\textsuperscript{69} Palmer, \textit{supra}, n. 46 at 140, suggests there is no action in conversion or detinue for negligent delay rendering, \textit{e.g.}, a valuable document - such as a lottery ticket - valueless.

\textsuperscript{70} Some examples: the distinction drawn between misfeasance and nonfeasance, direct and indirect acts, and the nature of the interest the plaintiff has (whether it is possession, ownership plus possession, or ownership plus a future right to possession). Chapter III pursues these aspects of the actions in greater detail.

\textsuperscript{71} Sometimes, however, the principles of damage calculation seem extremely quixotic: \textit{see, e.g.}, Gordon, \textit{supra}, n. 60.
exaggerated proposition still has more than a grain of truth. Fleming describes aspects of this feature as it applies in conversion.\textsuperscript{72}

This emphasis on possession, rather than ownership, is a legacy from an earlier time when wealth was primarily associated with tangibles and the law was preoccupied with repressing physical violence ... This explains the seeming paradox that a possessor without title, such as a finder, a bailee, a sheriff who has seized goods, and perhaps even a thief, may recover their full value; whereas an owner who has neither possession nor a right to immediate possession, like a bailor during an unexpired term, cannot compel the wrongdoer to buy him out. So great is the emphasis on protecting possession that even an owner may be guilty of conversion as by dispossessing his bailee during the subsistence of a bailment not determinable at will.

The structure of the law is built upon antiquated notions. The focus on possession, together with legal notions of who has possession in various cases, occasionally produce startling results.

2. IMMEDIATE RIGHTS AND OTHER KINDS OF RIGHTS: WHO MAY SUE?

Sometimes only a person who has possession can sue; at other times an immediate right to possession is enough. An owner without either attribute must pursue a different course for a remedy (the action on the case). Even accepting the law’s emphasis on possession as opposed to ownership, it is not clear why various distinctions in this regard need to be made. It appears to be one of the products of a medieval preoccupation with possessory rather than proprietary rights.

3. DIRECT INTERFERENCE AND INDIRECT INTERFERENCE

Some of the actions do not provide relief for damage resulting from the indirect actions of the wrongdoer. Again, the injured party must bring another action (on the case). The existence of this separate action states more clearly than anything else that limitations placed on the principal causes of action do not turn on the fairness of compensating a person for losses arising from indirect actions. There is no modern policy of the law that requires such a distinction to be made.\textsuperscript{73}

4. KINDS OF AVAILABLE REMEDIES

To the medieval lawyer, only a few kinds of property - such as title deeds and charters to property - were so unique that their return was essential. This remains largely true today. A person deprived of property can usually replace it. Consequently, the familiar remedy is an award of damages, not the return of property. In this respect, the common law attributes of detinue - which allowed a court to order the return of property - are remarkable.\textsuperscript{74}

\textsuperscript{72} Supra, n. 21 at 59.

\textsuperscript{73} The authors of the OLRC Study Paper (at 13), however, concluded that there was some utility in retaining the idea of direct interference for the action of trespass to chattels.

\textsuperscript{74} The bias in favour of damages was so strong that a wrongdoer had the option of paying compensation instead of returning the property until legislation amended the law in 1855. See supra, n. 27. Courts would sometimes increase the damages (adding an amount as punishment) so that the sensible defendant would prefer to return the property. Maitland, The Forms of Action at Common Law (1963) 62, suggests that reasons for the law’s policy “may be found partly in the perishable character of medieval movables, and the consequent feeling that the court
Even so, the law’s focus on paying compensation does not explain why it has adopted so many different approaches to measuring loss. Inconsistencies appear, at least in part, to be attributable to discarded features of the law. One example, mentioned before, is the most striking. Damages in detinue are measured at the date of trial, since they are in substitution for the return of property. Damages in conversion are measured at the date of conversion, overlooking the fact that they too are in substitution for the return of property, which the court now has statutory authority to order.

The common expectation is that the law will provide similar results on similar facts. Rights in personal property, however, vary between the torts. Choosing one action over another may affect the level of damages the court is able to award. We are unable to identify a rational policy in favour of such a result.

5. THIRD PARTY RIGHTS

C finds property. Before C can return it to the owner, D, B damages it. As we have seen, C can sue B. If C does, can B involve the owner in the proceedings?

Only a person who has an interest in the property, or asserts the authority of one who does, may raise the matter in defence. Otherwise, the law is not concerned that someone else may own all or part of the property. Consequently, B cannot join D in the proceedings, or resist C’s claim on the basis that the proper owner is D.

Why is this the law? The law must, for purposes of social order, protect possessory and proprietary rights. Actions affecting one person cannot be excused on the ground that another has an interest in the property.

The prohibition, however, leaves the defendant at risk. Other owners can sue the defendant. The defendant may be liable several times over for the same act. This may be costly if damages are arbitrarily set each time as the whole of the value of the goods.

Allowing the defendant to assert that there are other owners need not deprive the plaintiff of a remedy. Where two or more have an interest in the property, a damage award can be divided

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75 Another example relates to punitive damages. This is an area of the law that has been going through major revision and possibly the principles that apply where the wrong relates to personal property will be modified in the future. The old principles, however, are set out in Halsbury (1st ed.) 909. Punitive damages are not available in conversion. They are in trespass to chattels. They once were available in detinue, but not since the court was empowered to order the return of property. These statements were endorsed in Basted v. Grafton, [1948] 1 W.W.R. 614, 618 (B.C. Co. Ct.). See further Chapter IV, n. 21.


among them. Suppose other owners cannot be located, although it is clear that the plaintiff is not the sole owner. Simply confining the plaintiff’s damages to actual loss\textsuperscript{79} provides an adequate remedy. Exposing the defendant to the prospect of multiple proceedings brought by a variety of plaintiffs is unnecessary.

6. SUMMARY

Many aspects of the common law torts are out of step with policies that underlie other areas of the law. Various positions advanced by the common law torts are not supported by policy. Moreover, it is frequently in these areas that we find the different torts adopting conflicting positions. It is necessary to look elsewhere for an explanation of why the law is as we find it today.

\textsuperscript{79} Some provision could be made to allow a plaintiff to claim on behalf of other people with interests in the property. These issues are considered in Chapter IV.
A. Introduction

In one sense, much of the discussion in Chapter II is largely unnecessary. The forces that shaped the law are well known and all entirely historical. Leading texts agree on this point. They often observe that the common law dealing with wrongful interference with goods cannot be understood without an appreciation of its historical development. The introduction in Winfield is typical:

It is impossible to give an intelligible account of conversion without an historical sketch of the action of trover which was the remedy for it; nor is trover completely understandable without some knowledge of the other actions for injuries to, or interference with, chattels.

Our discussion has inquired first whether the law is operating sensibly, intentionally avoiding what most texts seem to regard as the natural order for exploring the common law torts. Unfortunately, explaining the law in terms of its history often leads to an uncritical treatment. Maitland is one of the few who frankly acknowledges that the law is not a rational product:

... we may be led into error by good masters. So long as the forms of action were still in use, it was difficult to tell the truth about their history. There they were, and it was the duty of judges and text writers to make the best of them, to treat them as though they formed a rational scheme provided all of a piece by some all-wise legislator. It was natural that lawyers should slip into the opinion that such had really been the case, to suppose, or to speak as though they supposed that some great king (it matters not whether we call him Edward I or Edward the Confessor, Alfred or Arthur) had said to his wise men, ‘Go to now! a well ordered state should have a central tribunal, let us then with prudent forethought analyze all possible rights and provide a remedy for every imaginable wrong.’ It was difficult to discover, difficult to tell, the truth, difficult to say that these forms of action belonged to very different ages, expressed very different and sometimes discordant theories of law, had been twisted and tortured to inappropriate uses, were the monuments of long forgotten political struggles; above all it was difficult to say of them that they had their origin and their explanation in a time when the king’s court was but one among many courts. But now, when the forms of action are gone, when we are no longer under any temptation to make them more rational than they were.

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3 Forms of Action at Common Law (1963) 10. See also Salmond, supra, n. 1. Maitland is referring to all of the forms of action, not just those dealing with personal property, but the remarks are still appropriate today since, unlike most other areas of the law, the personal property torts remain indelibly stamped with the precedents developed under the forms of action. R. Sutton, Personal Actions At Common Law (1929), e.g., says that a complete discussion of the common law torts - as true today as when it was first written - is to be found in Wilbraham v. Snow, (1669) Wns. Saund. 47, 85 E.R. 624, a nominate report annotated in 1825. In virtually every other area, legal principles have undergone such a substantial process of evolution and development, changing in step with modern thinking and needs, that a text of such antiquity would bear little resemblance to contemporary law.
the truth might be discovered and be told, and one part of the truth is assuredly this that throughout the early history of the forms of action there is an element of struggle, of struggle for jurisdiction. In order to understand them we must not presuppose a centralized system of justice, an omni-competent royal or national tribunal; rather we must think that the forms of action, the original writs, are the means whereby justice is becoming centralized, whereby the king’s court is drawing away business from other courts.

The discussion in this Chapter has an historical perspective but is still out of step with the usual approach adopted in texts, which tend to trace the development of the actions from earliest days until the nineteenth century, when principles seemed finally to crystallize. For our purposes, more is to be gained by comparing legal procedure today with the rules that existed before the great reforms of the nineteenth century. From this examination it can be seen that the curious features of the common law torts dealing with personal property are almost entirely the product of notions of law and procedure now long discarded.

B. Modern Procedure

In British Columbia, the Supreme Court can hear and grant an appropriate remedy or remedies, whether the plaintiff (or defendant) has one claim or more, and whether the matter involves a few people or many. The matter is brought to the court’s attention by documents setting out the facts that support the various claims asserted by the litigants.

The Rules of Court are designed so that usually everything needed to resolve the dispute is available in a single proceeding. The object is to avoid a proliferation of proceedings. The Rules of Court are based on this policy, which is so important it is set out separately in legislation. It is this feature of the law, originally adopted in England in 1873, that marks the transition between the old system of procedure and the new.

The rules set out a highly flexible procedure aimed at simplifying the task of stating the cases of the plaintiff and the defendant. While many of the rules are technical, the policy seems so natural that it is easy to think that the law must always have been this way. In fact, modern procedure would seem very strange indeed to a lawyer of the nineteenth century and before.

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5 *Law and Equity Act*, R.S.B.C 1979, c.224, s.10.

6 The future may well hold far simpler and more practical procedures. Today, many people are in favour of developing new forms of dispute resolution like mediation, and improving old methods, such as arbitration: see, e.g., *Access to Justice, the Report of the Justice Reform Committee* (1988). For conducting a trial, however, the current rules function well. Recent developments have not altered the focus on avoiding a multiplicity of proceedings. Instead, they are aimed at eliminating some of the more sophisticated tools available to resolve a dispute - such as discovery and lengthy trials - where the issues between the parties are straightforward, or the amount of money in dispute is not large.
C. The Former Procedural Law and the Common Law Torts

1. INTRODUCTION

The features of the current law described above are each “new” in the sense that they have been part of the law only since the latter part of the nineteenth century. Before that time, legal procedure was quite different, unrecognizably the parent of our present system.

2. DIVIDED JURISDICTION OF THE COURTS

Where there is now one court that can decide any dispute, a number of different courts served, each with a different, separate jurisdiction to hear particular matters. One system of law was administered by the courts of common law (the most notable being the Court of Common Pleas, the King’s Bench, and the Court of Exchequer). The jurisdiction of these courts overlapped in some respects, but not all matters could be heard by all courts.

The courts of common law did not administer “equity,” a separate system of justice that grew up, over the centuries, to temper the common law and which eventually became equally inflexible. Equity was administered by the Lord Chancellor.

A litigant had to be careful to bring the claim in the right court. If a mistake was made on that point, everything had to begin again.

First, a litigant had to decide whether the claim was one at law or in equity. If it was at law, care had to be taken to bring the action in the common law court that had jurisdiction to hear the matter.

The Court of Common Pleas, for example, had exclusive jurisdiction over the writ of detinue. The courts, however, competed for business - at a time when judges were paid by the litigants it was in their financial interest to be able to hear as broad a range of disputes as possible. Stratagems

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7 In this province, it is the Supreme Court of British Columbia. Even today, however, there are specialized courts, although they do not generate the jurisdictional problems encountered in the nineteenth century. E.g., matters involving small amounts of money are heard in the Small Claims Court. Matters involving a federal element may be heard in the Federal Court.

8 Our discussion necessarily compares modern procedure in British Columbia with the system that we inherited from England. While that system applied in British Columbia in colonial days, we did not have the same elaborate system of courts. The British Columbia Supreme Court has always administered both law and equity. This is because when our judicial system was established we only had one judge, Matthew Baillie Begbie who, even so, regarded his ability to administer law and equity as separate matters and would do so in separate proceedings.


10 Which they were, until 1825: Holdsworth, A History of English Law, vol. 3, 350.
were devised for enlarging the jurisdiction of the various courts.\textsuperscript{11} The Court of King’s Bench took the tort of conversion (then called “trover”) and, during the 16th and 17th centuries, refined and enlarged it to answer many cases in which formerly only detinue had provided a remedy. This is one reason why the various torts protecting personal property overlap to such an extent. By the early nineteenth century, conversion provided a remedy in most cases formerly dealt with by detinue and trespass to chattels.

There was no real need for the law to develop overlapping companion actions. The reason the law grew in this way was a response to procedural and jurisdictional concerns. Well over a century ago, procedural changes - most notably, the unification of the courts - made large parts of the common law actions dealing with personal property entirely unnecessary.

3. THE FORMS OF ACTION

To obtain relief today a claimant must establish that a wrong recognized at law has been committed. The claimant commences the proceedings with a general document, either a writ or a petition, and sets out the facts to support the claim.

The former practice was not so simple. The law recognized particular kinds of action and each had its special writ. Without a writ for the wrong complained of, there was no way to bring the action.\textsuperscript{12} A person who commenced an action using the wrong writ would be told by the court to start again. The differences in philosophy between today and a hundred and fifty years ago are striking.

The system of formal writs for discrete claims was called the “forms of action.” For 40 years (from 1832 until 1875) Parliament tried to rid the law of the forms of action,\textsuperscript{13} but their shadows

\textsuperscript{11} This process was helped by lawyers. Procedures, costs, defences and remedies varied from court to court. The dispute would be framed to bring it within the jurisdiction of the court that offered the best package.

\textsuperscript{12} One kind of generic writ was recognized, for the action on the case. Speculation concerning the origins of case caused something of an academic furor in the 1930's - see T.F.T. Plucknett, “Case and the Statute of Westminster 11,” (1931) 31 Col. L. Rev. 778; W.S. Holdsworth, (1931) 47 Law. Q. Rev. 334; P.A. Landon, The Action on the Case and the Statute of Westminster II,” (1936) 52 Law. Q. Rev. 68; T.F.T. Plucknett, “Case and Westminster II,” (1936) 52 Law. Q. Rev. 220 - with the result that much that was generally accepted has been called into question. Even so, this much is clear: while other writs were based on the wrong committed, the action on the case was based on the injury. The plaintiff would set out the court in this way. An action on the case allowed the courts some latitude in fashioning new causes of action. Trover began as an action on the case, as did elements of the law of negligence.

\textsuperscript{13} The reforms attempted to correct a malfunctioning system of procedure by simplifying the process of bringing an action before the appropriate court. These are some of the major events in the nineteenth century revision of procedural law:

i. 1832, \textit{Unification of Process Act}, 2 Will. IV, c.39: until 1832, there were different ways of starting an action depending on the form of the action and the appropriate court in which it had to be brought. This Act established a single writ, much like the modern writ, in replacement;

ii. 1833, \textit{Limitation of Actions and Suits relating to Real Property Act}, 3 & 4 Will. IV, c.27: this Act abolished real and mixed actions, with some exceptions, and also abolished wager of law (or “compurgation”). Wager of law was a ritualized oath. The defendant would win by
gathering the requisite number of oath givers who would swear orally, without fault, that the defendant made a good oath (not that what was said was true, because they needed no knowledge of that). It was the ritual that proved the defendant’s case. If, for example, any of the compurgators made a mistake in the oath, the defendant lost. Salmond describes it as “a form of licensed perjury which reduced to impotence all proceedings in which it was allowable.”

See Salmond, supra, n. 1 at 45.; iii. 1852, Common Law Procedure Act, 15 & 16 Vict., c.79, s.3: the Act removed the need to state the form of action in the writ, although each form of action still retained its own precedents;

iv. 1854, Common Law Procedure Act, 17 & 18 Vict., c.125: the Act allowed courts to order the return of property. The Common Law Procedure Acts of 1852 and 1854 went a great distance towards allowing common law courts to recognize equitable claims and defences and vice versa, by essentially vesting courts with a largely coordinate jurisdiction;

v. Judicature Acts of 1873, 36 & 37 Vict., c.66, and 1875, 38 & 39 Vict., c.77: these two Acts formed a single court to administer both law and equity, and abolished the forms of action.

The importance of selecting the correct writ continued until 1832, when legislation introduced an important reform: a single writ was created for all actions. It was no longer possible to use the wrong writ, but a plaintiff was still at risk if the wrong form of action was pleaded. That is why so many nineteenth century cases continued to be obsessed with the kind of wrong involved: Is this trespass to chattels? Is this conversion? The procedural reform did not go very far because the former policies were, it seemed, inextricably woven into the fabric of the substantive law. Further reforms, introduced in 1852 and 1873, also tried to break down the artificial boundaries between the actions. The last of these had the most success, but remnants of the forms of action are still patched to the law.

The forms of action, and their modern significance, was described by Diplock L.J. in Letang v. Cooper.16

It is important to stress just how fundamental this idea was in the nineteenth century. In Reynolds v. Clarke, (1725) 1 Str. 634, 636, 93 E.R. 747, 748, e.g., dealing with the distinction between trespass and case, it is said “We must keep up the boundaries of the actions; otherwise, we shall introduce the utmost confusion.”

15 Supra, n. 13.

A cause of action is simply a factual situation the existence of which entitles one person to obtain from the court a remedy against another person. Historically, the means by which the remedy was obtained varied with the nature of the factual situation and causes of action were divided into categories according to the “form of action” by which the remedy was obtained in the particular kind of factual situation which constituted the cause of action. But that is legal history, not current law. If A., by failing to exercise reasonable care, inflicts direct personal injury upon B., those facts constitute a cause of action on the part of B. against A. for damages in respect of such personal injuries. The remedy for this cause of action could, before 1873, have been obtained by alternative forms of action, namely, originally either trespass vi et armis or trespass on the case, later either trespass to the person or negligence ... Certain procedural consequences, the importance of which diminished considerably after the Common Law Procedure Act, 1852, flowed from the plaintiff’s pleader’s choice of the form of action used. The Judicature Act, 1873, abolished forms of action. It did not affect causes of action; so it was convenient for lawyers and legislators to continue to use, to describe the various categories of factual situations which entitled one person to obtain from the court a remedy against another, the names of the various “forms of action” by which formerly the remedy appropriate to the particular category of factual situation was obtained. But it is essential to realise that when, since 1873, the name of a form of action is used to identify a cause of action, it is used as a convenient and succinct description of a particular category of factual situation which entitles one person to obtain from the court a remedy against another person. To forget this will indeed encourage the old forms of action to rule us from their graves.

Much judicial work of the 20th century has focused on weeding out the archaic notions. Some areas of the law seem to be entirely free of the influence of the forms of action. In other areas, the influence is all too visible.

The law of contract, for example, consists of precedents developed over the centuries. Even so, following the procedural reforms of the nineteenth century, the courts managed to recast the law to fashion a synthesis of the relevant contractual principles. Contractual issues are no longer analyzed in terms of the forms of action - debt, covenant and assumpsit - which originally provided remedies in that sphere, nor, as was formerly the case, in terms of the different kinds of contract (for the sale of goods, of employment and so on). In the field of wrongful interference with goods, however, the law is still asking in effect, “which writ was used to bring this action.” B has C’s property and the law asks: is it trespass? is it detinue? is it conversion? These are the wrong questions. They lost any meaning in 1873. The correct questions, in terms of modern legal policy and procedure, should be: Is C entitled to the return of the property? Has C suffered any damage for which B should be responsible? A single, statutory tort, framed to ask these two questions, would unify the law and clear away a good deal of confusion.

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17 There are numerous examples, but see, e.g., Cahoon v. Franks, [1967] S.C.R. 455, 458-9 (concerning the lingering effects of the forms of action on a limitations issue); Letang v. Cooper, ibid.: United Australia Ltd. v. Barclays Bank Ltd., [1941] A.C. 1 (H.L.). Sometimes, the courts need the assistance of legislation to restate the principles. See, e.g., Report on Set-Off (LRC 97, 1988).

18 P.S. Attiyah, Pragmatism and Theory in English Law (1987). Attiyah credits the great contract scholars of the latter party of the nineteenth century, when the first modern texts on contract appeared, with developing a single theory of contract.

19 Assumpsit eventually superseded the older personal actions of debt and covenant and formed the basis of our law of contract: Holdsworth, supra, n. 4. Today, in law of contract, there is little if any consideration of the separate channels of precedent that originally served the separate writs. Only odds and ends exist, such as, e.g., the legal significance of a sealed document, which preserves much of the ancient law of covenant: see Report on Deeds and Seals (LRC 96, 1988).
4. MULTIPLE CLAIMS

For most of the nineteenth century, the focus of the law was not on limiting the number of proceedings, but on narrowing the issues between the parties. The special procedural rules devised for that purpose, now long abandoned, increased the likelihood that multiple proceedings would be necessary before the legal dispute was resolved.

Under the former procedure, the plaintiff could raise only one claim in a proceeding and usually had to elect immediately between alternative forms of relief. For example, C steals B’s car and sells it to D. Does B want damages for the conversion? Or does B want to recover the proceeds of the sale? At one time, B had to decide before starting the action. A claim for the proceeds meant that B could not proceed against C for the conversion. A person wishing to pursue other claims, even if they were all related, had to bring them in separate proceedings.

Similarly, since the whole emphasis was on narrowing the matters in dispute to a single issue, a defendant was usually unable to raise a claim against the plaintiff in the same proceeding, even if it was directly related to the matter in dispute.

Modern pleading requires the plaintiff to set out the facts supporting the claim. The facts may support one or more causes of action. In this way, a plaintiff can request one or more remedies and raise any number of related claims in the same proceedings.

More than one curious feature of the law can be directly traced from the old procedural rules. The emphasis on identifying the exact nature of the plaintiff’s claim is an example. Under the former practice, it made sense to say: “this is trespass to chattels,” or “this is conversion,” because the rules forced the plaintiff to choose between them. Today, it is not only inconsistent with the rule that requires the plaintiff to plead facts, it is unnecessary because the evidence at trial will establish the kind of wrong that actually occurred.

“Modern” principles of damage assessment also bear marks of the forms of action. The “severe” and the “mild” rule discussed in the last Chapter can be partly explained as an incomplete synthesis of principles worked out in two separate forms of action.

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20 In Fouldes v. Willoughby, (1841) 8 M. & W. 540, 151 E.R. 1153, e.g., the plaintiff selected conversion and was told that his claim was in trespass to chattels. See also Bowen, supra, n. 13 at 520 “... and two causes of complaint could not be prosecuted in one and the same action unless they belonged to the same metaphysical form.” This principle had a few, but not many, exceptions. In fact, in some cases, not only the claim, but the kind of relief required, dictated the choice of court. A broken agreement to sell land provides a useful example. Only a court of equity could order a defendant to complete the sale. Only a court of common law could award damages for breaking the agreement.

21 An exception was made by statute where the plaintiff sued to recover a debt and the defendant was owed a debt by the plaintiff. In other cases, a defendant could sometimes request a court of equity to stay proceedings in a court of common law until the defendant’s claim could be heard in separate proceedings before another court. See further Report on Set-Off, supra, n. 17.

22 See further the discussion in Chapter IV at n. 12.
5. MULTIPLE PARTIES

For the same reason - to refine the dispute to a single issue - the rules had the objective of restricting the number of parties involved in the proceeding. This is an additional way that procedural policies shaped the substantive law.

Limits were placed on who could sue and who could be sued. This policy can be seen in the way the separate torts developed: one tort for a person who had possession of the property; another for an owner out of possession; another for a person who would only become entitled to possession at a later date. The emphasis on narrowing the parties to the proceedings led to the development of remedies that were only available to parties satisfying a particular description. Consequently, where more than one person had an interest in the affected property, even if they agreed, the law prevented them from taking part in the same proceeding. They had to use different writs and raise different actions in order to bring separate proceedings, in some cases to be heard by judges of different courts.

The policy of restricting the parties to a dispute also led to restricting a defendant’s ability to add other parties to the proceeding. A defendant who believed someone else was responsible for the plaintiff’s loss, or someone else had a better claim than the plaintiff, could not join that person. There were no procedures for doing so, and legal rules were developed based on the principle that third party interests were largely irrelevant. This was probably one of the reasons that led to the rule preventing a defendant from raising a third party’s interest in the plaintiff’s property as a defence.

The torts that protect rights in personal property are consistent with the former procedural principles of the law and quite out of step with the current principles. Modern law assumes as a usual rule that all parties suffering or causing a particular loss should take part in a single proceeding, in order to limit the number of proceedings that must eventually be brought to settle all of the matters in dispute.

6. PLEADING

(a) Narrowing the Issues in Dispute

The policy of narrowing the questions in dispute to a single issue also carried through into the style of pleadings. Pleadings were technical and involved. Today one party will file a document setting out the basis of the claim asserted (this is called a “Statement of Claim”), the other party will answer with a “Statement of Defence,” and that will usually be the end of formal pleadings. Formerly, however, a series of technical documents - declaration, defence, reply, rejoinder, surrejoinder and so on - would be exchanged until a single question was presented to the court for decision.

This highly sophisticated process reduced issues to technical, arid questions that had, it sometimes seemed, little to do with the actual dispute between the parties. One example might be

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23 The position is equally straightforward where proceedings are brought by petition.
useful: in detinue and in conversion, as discussed in the last Chapter, evidence of the tort may consist of (1) a request for return of the goods, and (2) an unqualified refusal to return them.24 Suppose B gives goods to C to deliver to D, and C does so. B has a change of heart and demands the goods back from C. C no longer has them and can’t return them.25 To a modern eye, C’s actions do not appear to be conversion or, for that matter, any wrong at all. To the nineteenth century lawyer, however, the claim is in conversion and pleadings reduce the issues to the central one: Was a request for return refused? This kind of analysis is still part of our current law.26 Asking whether a defendant can properly refuse to return goods that the defendant no longer has seems to be a very oblique way to approach the issue.27 It would make more sense to ask instead: Does the defendant retain the plaintiff’s property? If so, should it be returned to the plaintiff? If not, should the defendant compensate the plaintiff? Precedents developed during the nineteenth century in an entirely different legal and procedural context, however, still dictate the content of our modern law, a point forcefully made by Salmond almost 90 years ago:28

Forms of action are dead, but their ghosts still haunt the precincts of the law. In their life they were powers of evil, and even in death they have not wholly ceased from troubling. In earlier days they filled the law with formalism and fiction, confusion and complexity, and though most of the mischief which they did has been buried with them, some portion of it remains inherent in the law of the present day. Thus if we open a book on the law of torts, howsoever modern and rationalized, we can still hear the echoes of the old controversies concerning the contents and boundaries of trespass and detinue and trover and case, and we are still called upon to observe distinctions and subtleties that have no substance or justification in them, but are nothing more than an evil inheritance from the days when forms of action and of pleading held the legal system in their clutches.

In no branch of the law is this more obvious than in that which relates to the different classes of wrongs which may be committed with respect to chattels. In particular the law of trover and conversion is a region still darkened with the mists of legal formalism, through which no man will find his way by the light of nature or with any other guide save the old learning of writs and forms of action and the mysteries of pleading.

(b) Pleading and Legal Fictions

Much of the law has developed in steps. A legal principle applied in one case is reconsidered,

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24 This requirement seems to be an essential feature of detinue: see, e.g., Ball v. Sawyer-Massey Co., [1929] 2 W.W.R. 582 (Sask. C.A.) and is a good example of nineteenth century procedural concerns becoming transformed into 20th century substantive law. Perhaps a request and refusal is necessary to support the action of detinue, but would seem to be an entirely unnecessary precondition for empowering a court to order the return of property under Rule 46. A formal request, and a refusal, served a different purpose for conversion: see infra, n. 38.


26 See, e.g., Capital Finance Co. v. Bray, [1964] 1 W.L.R. 323 (C.A.); Asfar Consulting Engineering (Ace) v. Mahood, [1988] B.C.D. Civ. 999-03 (S.C.); See also Stanley Canada v. 683481 Ontario, [1990] O.J. No. 1760, 23 A.C.W.S. (3d) 143 (Ont. Ct. (Gen. Div.)). The defendant refused to deliver property across the picket line. The real issue appears to be whether a holder of property is under a duty to deliver it. Shaped by the contours of these ancient torts, however, the question becomes: is a refusal to deliver a wrongful detention? The answer: no.

27 This form of pleading is explained by Salmond, supra, n. 1 at 51-2, as the trick that allowed trover to serve in cases formerly dealt with in detinue.

28 Ibid., at 43.
and possibly revised, in new situations presented by later cases. A technique once much used in this process of adaptation is the legal fiction. Lawyers and judges would pretend - through the use of a fictitious device - that nothing had changed at all and that old tools were not being applied in new situations. The pretense sometimes involved constructing a story that would be assumed to be true, in order to raise and answer a particular legal question. This description is not very helpful without an example or two of the process in operation.

A striking example is found in the development of real property law. Until 1852, legal questions about the ownership of land relied upon an elaborate fiction that transformed an action originally used to protect tenants’ rights.

Suppose B occupies land that A claims to own. A would not simply sue B and claim to be the proper owner. Instead, a scenario was devised under which A, it was pretended, leased land to John Doe, a fictitious person, who was wrongfully ousted by Richard Roe, another fictitious person. A would sue Roe in the name of Doe. One of the documents delivered to B, the true defendant, would be a notice from Roe advising that Roe intended to let judgment go by default (in which case, the sheriff could be directed to evict B). This was the action of ejectment.

Legal fictions operate well only in particular fact patterns and have a tendency to generate still more fictions. The law used (and in some cases still uses) them as a crutch: adopting a legal fiction avoids the need to define the actual principles of law involved. Unfortunately, it is often easy to mistake a legal fiction for a substantive principle of law. The nineteenth century was particularly fond of fictions. A 20th century trend has been to do away with them.

Many examples of legal fictions can be found in the law dealing with personal property. Most discussions make the point that detinue involves a wrongful detention and trespass to chattels requires a direct interference with the property. The gist of trover, however, is the conversion (the wrongdoer converts the property of another to the wrongdoer’s own purposes). Except by a stretch of the imagination, few acts embraced by trover seem to really involve a conversion. A person who damages property belonging to another may be liable in trespass to chattels (if the damage is slight) or in conversion (if it is substantial). What event transforms the wrongdoer’s act from a trespass into a conversion to the wrongdoer’s own purposes? Another instance: withholding property is detinue, but to both withhold and use it is characterized as conversion. The lines being drawn are very fine indeed. One more example: If trover requires a conversion, it seems to follow that the wrongdoer

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29 The common law also provided an action allowing A to recover the land directly, but it was an ancient, intricate, ponderous proceeding, subject to serious delays and involving trial by battle. It was an unpopular action. An alternative remedy had to be developed.

30 When this action was first being transformed, the owner of the land engaged in a little charade before bringing the action: the owner would actually lease the land to a friend, and arrange for the friends’ ouster from the property: see A.W.B. Simpson, An Introduction to the History of Land Law (1961) 135-145.

31 Eventually, the style of cause for ejectment in old case reports takes the form of Doe d. [plaintiff’s name] v. [defendant’s name]. Doe is the fictitious plaintiff. The “d.” is an abbreviation of “demise,” which means to grant or lease. The style of cause would translate as: The fictitious defendant under a lease from [the true plaintiff] against [the true defendant].
must have had possession of the goods. This is an issue that proved troublesome in several cases. The idea, however, now appears to be entirely abandoned. It is clear that substantial damage to a chattel is conversion, even if the damage is caused by someone who never had possession. While there is general agreement that the gist of trover is the conversion, it is an essential element that doesn’t always seem to carry very much weight.

A review of 16th century procedural concerns suggests that many of the features the modern law regards as bearing on the issue are little more than fictions used by one court to usurp the jurisdiction of another. Detinue was the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Common Pleas. For a variety of reasons, such as the availability of the defence of wager of law, litigants wanted an alternative to detinue. Trover was a writ of the Court of King’s Bench but, in the 16th century, the Court was reluctant to extend its writ to cover situations dealt with by other writs of other courts. In Lord Mounteagle v. Countess of Worcester, for example, it is said that an action on the case (trover) will not lie,

... because it appears that the plaintiff may well maintain an action of detinue, and when a man has an ordinary writ ready framed in the Register for his case, then he shall not sue out a new form of writ.

By the end of the 17th century the objection that another writ already applied was no longer persuasive but, in the meantime, the pleading of conversion had been shaped to distinguish it from both detinue and trespass to chattels, possibly for the sole reason of overcoming the technical objection. The writ of trover alleged that the property had been found by the wrongdoer (to distinguish it from trespass, where the writ only applied if the plaintiff had been in possession when the wrong was committed), and that the property had been sold by the defendant and the proceeds converted to the defendant’s use, whether or not there had been a sale (to distinguish it from detinue, because detinue could not provide a remedy where the wrongdoer no longer had the property). While these are clearly legal fictions - a defendant could not defend the action on the basis that the fictitious averments were false - they came to shape the way we think of these torts: the gist of trover is the conversion of the property to the wrongdoer’s uses. What we regard as an important feature of the substantive law is not really a reflection of sound legal policy, but the consequence of a subterfuge by which a court extended its jurisdiction. It is a good example of long forgotten procedural manoeuvring masquerading as substantive law.

To summarize: the old form of pleading answered two needs. First, it was designed to narrow the dispute between the parties to a single issue. Sometimes the conventions of formal pleading


34 See supra, n. 13.

35 (1556) 2 Dy. 121a at f. 121b, 73 E.R. 254. See also Holdsworth, A History of the English Law (2nd ed., 1937) vol. 7, 408.

36 Holdsworth, ibid., at 413.

characterized the dispute in terms that now appear somewhat arbitrary and artificial. Even after the total transformation of procedural policies and rules, these features of the law remain alive today.

Second, the pleadings were used to emphasize distinctions between the writs, again in response to now abandoned procedural principles, so that different courts, using different writs, could still apply them in largely similar fact patterns (while pretending not to). This has produced a legal position today that is not without a little irony. Legal ingenuity allowed the different courts to provide satisfactory remedies in a broad range of areas. The formation of one supreme court of judicature removed any need for overlapping remedies. Pretenses once used to broaden the torts are now mistakenly seen as substantive principles narrowing the ambit of these actions, allowing the five (and more) causes of action that cover the area to operate in some kind of harmony. But we are so far distant from the former law that few are probably aware that this process has taken place.

These are the forces that shape the current law. They have fragmented the law into discrete areas, serving no modern purpose. They produce legal and technical differentiation for its own sake.

D. Summary

Reviewing the former law serves two purposes. It underscores the many odd aspects of the current law and it explains their origin. For the most part, the law is riddled with curious distinctions and has evolved in highly technical ways. It developed not in answer to the demands of policy but by historical accident, in the process of bridging gaps in the jurisdiction of the courts. Various features of the law are left-over responses to now rejected procedural ideas that were once the embarrassment of the English system of justice. The correction of the jurisdictional and procedural problems should have allowed the law to develop in a more rational way, but that has not happened.

Some of the oddities listed above are usefully summarized here: the law draws distinctions based on the nature of the plaintiff’s interest in the property, which provides the basis for selecting among five (and more) torts for the appropriate route to a remedy. The law also draws distinctions on other factors, such as whether the wrong complained of was direct or indirect, whether it was the result of misfeasance or nonfeasance, whether the interference with property was nominal or serious.

38 Another example is the legal analysis applied where conversion deals with a wrongful taking and a wrongful detention. The first of these was originally dealt with by trespass, the second by detinue. When conversion was being extended to apply in these cases, two inconsistent techniques were adopted which remain a confusing part of the current law. A wrongful taking was originally regarded as a trespass but it was eventually held that conversion could apply and that the act of taking was a constructive converting to one’s personal use (since not every taking will have that element). For a wrongful detention, however, it was held that a refusal by the holder of the owner’s request to return the property is not in itself conversion, but strong evident of it. Salmond, supra, n. 1 at 52, points out the inconsistency:

If we use the term conversion in its original and strict sense, it is clear that neither a taking nor a detention is anything more than evidence; each amounts at the most to a constructive conversion, a conversion of law though not in fact. While if we adopt the wider sense, and mean by conversion any deprivation of property, it is clear that both a taking and a detention are actually conversions, if there is no lawful justification for them, and that there is no distinction to be drawn between them. To say that taking is a conversion in two diverse senses, its old and its new; it is to retain the old historical theory of trover in one case, and to abandon it in the other.
and whether the injury was to dominion, possession or a right to possession. The modern law usually takes most of these factors into account when deciding whether a wrong has occurred, selecting the kind of remedy, and settling on an appropriate level of damages. Legacies of history, however, require these factors to find expression in the choice of one among various disparate causes of action dealing with rights in personal property.

A comparison of the actions reveals indefensible levels of inconsistency. Different actions provide different kinds of remedies, different rules for assessing damages, and different principles for determining liability. Even the constituent elements of the actions are antiquated, based largely on a belief in the equivalence of money and property and focusing not on ideas of ownership but rather possession (and, in the process, applying peculiar rules for determining who has possession).

Signs like these suggest a question: is there a need for reform? This question is pursued in the next Chapter.

39 Trespass is considered interference with possession - even though the plaintiff need not necessarily have had physical custody of the property - while detinue and conversion are considered to be interference with rights of possession: see Pollock and Wright, *An Essay on Possession in the Common Law* (1888) 28.
CHAPTER IV                                                   THE NEED FOR REFORM

A. Introduction

Chapters II and III show that the law of wrongful interference with goods is flawed. Many of its defects are attributable to historical development. The great nineteenth century reforms cleared the way for the courts to rationalize this area of the law, but steps that have been taken for this purpose have been hesitant at best.

The need for legislative restatement arises when the engine of the common law is unable to keep legal principles operating logically and consistently in changed economic and social settings. This Chapter considers the extent to which modern courts have managed to keep the law up-to-date, and factors that may be responsible for delaying legal development.

B. The Likelihood of a Common Law Solution

1. DETINUE, ITS DEATH AND REVIVAL

At one point in the eighteenth century it appeared that a single action would eventually answer in most cases dealing with wrongful interference with property. Conversion virtually replaced detinue and trespass to chattels. Had this course of development continued, it would have been a fairly straightforward matter for the usual process of the common law to refine the appropriate principles, from case to case, as new legal issues emerged.

Why did conversion prevail, at least temporarily, over its rivals? The similarities between conversion and trespass are marked. Conversion overtook trespass because, possibly, it applied in more cases. A remedy was more likely to be available in conversion than trespass. Whatever the reason, conversion eventually came to govern, particularly in more serious matters.

DetINUE’s popularity waned because of wager of law. Wager of law was mentioned in the last Chapter. A defendant could win the case by gathering eleven neighbours prepared to swear that the defendant had made a good oath (that they knew the defendant to be truthful). The defence had nothing to do with the facts of the case and allowed many to escape liability. Most areas of the law abandoned the procedure, but it was available in detinue until 1832.

Wager of law was never available in conversion. A claimant would prefer, if it was at all possible, to frame the claim in conversion instead of detinue. In time, conversion evolved to deal with most of the situations detinue had addressed.1

Thus, by the beginning of the eighteenth century, Trespass and the various branches that it had thrown out, had come to be the only forms of action that were in very common use ... Trover covered, and

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With the decline of detinue, the law became more straightforward. Trespass to chattels and trover provided almost a complete array of remedies and, in many cases, trover prevailed over trespass.

In 1832, legislation abolished wager of law,2 breathing new life into the action of detinue, which by then had been largely unused for over one hundred years. Where the development of the law had been following a course of simplification, in the form of the single tort of conversion, there was again a rival. From that day until this, consequently, the law has developed in several separate channels (trespass to chattels, detinue, conversion and case) instead of one.

2. THE COMMON LAW ACTIONS IN THE 20TH CENTURY

Chapter II discussed in some detail the classical features of the common law torts. This description, although supported by the leading texts, may not truly reflect the views of modern courts. A computer assisted search of current Canadian law, for example, shows many cases deal with interference with property. Only a few of these make any more than a passing mention of the law. More often, the court notes that a claim was made for compensation for damage to property or a wrongful detention3 and later, without much discussion, makes an award or declines to do so. If the property is destroyed or otherwise unrecoverable, damages are assessed as the value of the property. Otherwise, the plaintiff’s actual losses decide the award.

Modern courts have proved to be hostile to many of the positions technically advanced by the law. The principle that conversion measures damages as the whole of the value of the goods is an instance. In one case,4 for example, a person, B, salvaged, repaired and used a tractor abandoned in tidal waters by the federal government. C learned of B’s efforts and arranged to purchase the property from the government for $100. The repairs, however, raised the tractor’s value closer to $8000. C wasn’t interested in the property. He saw a way of making some money and sued the salvager in conversion, expressly refusing to claim detinue. The court could not bring itself to require the salvager to pay the whole of the value of the repaired property. It found instead (arguably against the evidence) that there had been no conversion. The plaintiff received no remedy

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2 3 & 4 Will. IV, c.42, s.13.

3 See, e.g., Cashman Holdings v. Canada Trustco Mortgage, [1990] B.C.D. Civ. No. 2769-05 (S.C.). Few cases spend much time worrying about the principles applied: see, e.g., McLachlan v. C.I.B.C., [1989] 4 W.W.R. 341 (B.C.C.A.) where the Court of Appeal, and the two trial court decisions (one on liability, the other damages) do not deal at all with the law relating to trespass to chattels and the principles that apply when calculating damages. Even the vocabulary of the law has changed. It is unusual, for example, to find a court referring to detinue. More often, the court deals with a “wrongful detention.” If the claim is classified, it is usually referred to as conversion. The OLRC Study Paper notes the paucity of trespass to good cases litigated, which cannot be explained by the broad scope of conversion, since conversion does not answer in every case that trespass provides a remedy. Of particular value, in the OLRC Study Paper, is the empirical research that was carried out. The survey analyzed court files from Essex County and the Judicial District of York during 1981/82. The survey “revealed that the profession in fact often does not classify causes of action in this area under the relevant label or labels. Instead, they utilize the freedom offered by our system of fact-based pleading.” (At 35). The authors of the Study Paper note that the law is both little understood and seldom taught “in common law faculties of law, falling as it does between the law of torts and the law of property.”

whatsoever.

A refusal to apply settled law, and the inability to give an owner an appropriate remedy, is a pretty clear sign that the law does not advance contemporary policies. Courts appear to require more flexibility than the current law grants them.

Construing the state of the modern law is necessarily impressionistic. Possibly, there is a gap between theory and application. What clues there are suggest that the common law is, in these areas, undergoing a process of synthesis but one that is not taking place overtly. If the law is being altered, the changes taking place are implicit, usually subtle, at times almost imperceptible.

There are, of course, cases that endorse the technical features of the common law actions. Not all of these seem to have completely mastered the more complex aspects of the law, however. Consider, for example, Rowbotham v. Nave. R loaned money to N. A chattel mortgage secured the loan. Under the terms of the mortgage, the lender had no immediate right to the possession of the property. Consequently, when the borrower wrongfully sold the security, the lender could not bring an action in trespass to chattels, detinue or conversion. The court did acknowledge that “an action may lie for the damage to [the lender’s] reversionary interest in the goods” but, like a court of the nineteenth century, did not further consider the issue. A failure to make out the action supported by the writ was an end of the matter even where the defendant was clearly responsible for a different wrong. Perhaps the plaintiff had pleaded incorrectly. Under modern rules, however, it is difficult to make a fatal mistake because a plaintiff is only required to plead the facts, not characterize the legal wrong. Mislabeling the action is not usually fatal. Perhaps the court was misled by nineteenth century precedent decided under the old procedural rules. Whatever the explanation, the court’s approach resembles more that of a pre-Judicature Act court than a modern day one.

The legal rules for the assessment of damages is another area that still carries forward technical features of the old forms of action. It was mentioned in Chapter II that the British Columbia Court of Appeal, in the Shewish case, has affirmed that where trees are logged from property, there is a mild and there is a severe rule for measuring damages. A defendant who acts innocently or negligently must pay the plaintiff the market price of the lumber, less the costs of cutting the trees and taking them to market. A defendant who acts intentionally, however, is not permitted to deduct the costs of cutting down the trees. When damages are assessed in this way, the plaintiff is compensated for actual losses and something more. Damage assessment has a punitive element.

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7 See, e.g., OLRC Study Paper, 35.

8 The same principles apply where minerals are extracted.

9 Ironically, it is generally agreed that punitive damages are not available in conversion: see supra, Chapter II, n. 71. Clearly, however, while the courts might not make an express award of punitive damages, parts of some awards serve the same kind of purpose.
It seems sensible enough that a person who acts intentionally should be subject to a greater penalty than one who acts innocently, but it is not completely obvious why the law has settled on this particular approach for distinguishing between different kinds of wrongs. An approach more consistent with modern principles of damage assessment might be to first determine an amount to compensate the plaintiff for losses and then determine an additional amount as aggravated or punitive damages. Why is the additional component in damage awards made in these cases determined in such an arbitrary way?

Suppose B mines A’s coal without permission. What amount of money would compensate A for the loss? A has lost the opportunity to sell the coal. It would make sense, consequently, to compensate A for the lost profit. That would be measured by the market value of coal less the costs of severing and bringing the coal to market. The mild rule of damage assessment, consequently, focuses on compensating the plaintiff for what has actually been lost. It was not the mild rule, however, but the severe rule that was originally applied by the courts in these cases. Why did the courts originally select the severe rule to assess damages?

The reason is to be found in the way claims were formerly brought before the court. The first cases dealing with this issue were claims in trover. Trover relates to the conversion of a chattel. Consequently, the court’s attention was not on the extraction of coal, but what happened with the coal once it was severed from the land and became a chattel. So far as the law was concerned, no wrong occurred until after the coal was mined, when the defendant transported it to market for sale. The plaintiff’s losses, consequently, were not based on the value of coal before its extraction but after it had been mined. For that reason, the defendant was not entitled to deduct the costs of mining the coal.

Even though procedural rules forced this kind of analysis, pre-Judicature Act courts were aware that it overcompensated the plaintiff. Fortunately, principles of damage assessment were relatively fluid and it was possible for the courts to modify them in such a way that the so-called “mild rule” - aimed at simply compensating the plaintiff for actual losses - applied in cases where the defendant acted innocently or negligently.

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10 In the particular facts of the case, this formula might be unduly simplistic. Mining the coal may have caused damage to land formerly used for recreational purposes. Or the coal market might be depressed and a well advised person would wait to market the coal. Even so, while there may be special circumstances to take into account in particular cases, the general principles of damage assessment are clear.


12 A damage award aims at making the plaintiff whole. Damages can be determined by reference to at least three different objects: (1) replacing or repairing the damage done to the plaintiff’s property; (2) giving the plaintiff the profit the plaintiff would have made from removing the trees (or minerals) from the land; (3) giving the plaintiff the profit the wrongdoer made from dealing with the plaintiff’s land. (Items (2) and (3) may be the same amount, but they represent different premises for damage assessment). Suppose D mines and markets P’s coal. In the ground, the coal is worth $50. It costs $25 to extract coal and carry it to the surface and another $15 to bring it to market. If damages are measured by the profit the plaintiff could have made, damages should be assessed as market value, less all of the costs of extraction and transportation. If the coal can be sold for $90, P should receive $50 ($90 less the $40 it cost to mine and transport). This is the amount the “milder” rule would award P. If the severe rule applied, P would receive $75, an amount more than the actual loss (the additional amount is arbitrarily set at the cost of extraction).
No reason exists for retaining these principles of damage assessment, based as they are on technical features of the law that have now been abandoned. The courts should assess damages to compensate for the plaintiff’s actual loss, using, essentially, the mild rule for that purpose. If there is more in the defendant’s behaviour that justifies compensation, it should be dealt with in the form of an award for aggravated or punitive damages.

3. FAILURE OF EARLIER REFORMS

The common law is not alone in its failure to come to terms with these torts. Legislation has not been notably successful either.

The history of detinue provides a good example. Detinue’s popularity was due to the unusual remedy it provided, namely the return of property. For this reason, its revival was welcomed after the abolition of wager of law. A person not content with an award of damages (the only remedy available in conversion) would now frame the claim as one of detinue. But detinue’s exclusive right to return property lasted for only another twenty years. Legislation enacted in 1854 allowed the court to order the return of property in any case involving a wrongful interference with personal property. This reform effectively removed the need for the action of detinue, and yet it survives to this day as the method by which a court can make an order compelling the return of property. The legislative reform is largely ignored.

Suppose B takes C’s goods. The law could have developed in this way:

*In the circumstances, the court decides that an award of damages (assessed as the whole of the value of the goods) is inappropriate. It orders the return of the property, under its statutory power to do so.*

*Instead, the courts say: This is not conversion. It is detinue. And then it orders the return of the property.*

Legal analysis continues to be shaped by the common law and the forms of action.

The forms of action have even survived the reforms introduced by the *Judicature Acts* in 1873

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13 The abolition of wager of law did not have as its reason the resurrection of detinue, but the removal of an obsolete form of defence generally.


15 Except in a very few instances involving bailment.

16 Modern courts mention it even where it is inapplicable, almost as if it were part of an incantation: *see, e.g., Com/Mit Hi-Tech Services v. Valley-Yu Realty (Ottawa), (1990) 21 A.C.W.S. (3d) 506 (Ont. H.C.J.)*.

17 *See, e.g., Mayne v. Kidd, (1951) 1 W.W.R. 833 (Sask. C.A.). In some cases, the statutory power to order the return of property is applied, shaped by the principles of detinue, so that a court will still order damages if the goods are of no special value, or leave the matter to the defendant’s option.*
The reforms introduced by the Judicature Acts encouraged a judicial rethinking of the common law immediately after they were passed and for many years following, possibly until the last of the judges familiar with pre-Judicature Act procedure retired from the bench. Certainly, more recently many cases are decided by reference to pre-Judicature Act authority without considering whether changes in procedure cast doubt upon the soundness of the precedent. The law of set-off, canvassed in our Report on Set-Off (LRC 97, 1988) records a similar pattern in the evolution of judicial thinking. Immediately after the Judicature Acts, the seminal cases on modern set-off were decided, recasting the principles in light of the new procedure. Modern courts have recently modified some of these principles by reference to “binding” pre-Judicature Act authority, possibly without a sufficient appreciation of the quite different procedural rules forming the context within which set-off was originally developed.  

The old learning on the subject of ‘conversion’ need not be imported into the system introduced by The Judicature Act, which provides for redress in case the plaintiff’s goods are wrongfully detained or in case he is wrongfully deprived of them. In all such cases the real question is, whether there has been such an unauthorized dealing with the plaintiff’s property as has caused him damage, and if so, to what extent has he sustained damage.

A hundred years of judicial development has not quite brought the law to this point. A legislative push is probably necessary.

4. FACTORS THAT MAY EXPLAIN WHY THE LAW HAS STOPPED DEVELOPING

This area of the law is one of the few that has somehow managed to resist the great nineteenth century reforms. It is difficult to explain why. One possible reason, operating in other areas that have similarly remained unchanged, is the sheer complexity of the former law combined with the relatively rare times it is necessary for a court to consider the matters. Cases involving rights in personal property arise frequently enough. These cases, however, do not seem to raise questions that involve the court in a major reconsideration of the basic principles of the law. Where contract has

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18 Supra, Chapter II, n. 29.

19 The reforms introduced by the Judicature Acts encouraged a judicial rethinking of the common law immediately after they were passed and for many years following, possibly until the last of the judges familiar with pre-Judicature Act procedure retired from the bench. Certainly, more recently many cases are decided by reference to pre-Judicature Act authority without considering whether changes in procedure cast doubt upon the soundness of the precedent. The law of set-off, canvassed in our Report on Set-Off (LRC 97, 1988) records a similar pattern in the evolution of judicial thinking. Immediately after the Judicature Acts, the seminal cases on modern set-off were decided, recasting the principles in light of the new procedure. Modern courts have recently modified some of these principles by reference to “binding” pre-Judicature Act authority, possibly without a sufficient appreciation of the quite different procedural rules forming the context within which set-off was originally developed.


21 The observation has been endorsed in a number of cases. See, e.g., Dzaman v. Riggs, [1927] 3 W.W.R. 433 ( Alta. C.A.); Basted v. Grafton, [1948] 1 W.W.R. 614 (B.C. Co. Ct.). In Basted, ironically, the judge refers to the quote from Stimson - which suggests that pre-Judicature Act authority should be treated with suspicion - and then simply adopts without consideration pre-Judicature Act principles relating to punitive damages: see supra, Chapter II, n. 75. The issue had been previously considered in a half page decision by the Manitoba Court of Appeal, Campbell v. Northern Crown Bank, (1914) 7 W.W.R. 321. The court, relying on Halsbury, said that the claim for punitive damages in conversion was “plainly not justified by authority.” The authority cited by Halsbury, however, does not deal with punitive damages at all. Finch v. Blount, 7 Car. & P. 478, 173 E.R. 212, deals with whether a defendant can reduce liability for conversion on the basis that a third party also has an interest in the goods. It is in this way that much of our modern law of conversion has been handed down to us. Senseless distinctions, sometimes supported by case authority, sometimes not, are accepted at face value.

22 Such as the law of set-off.
evolved dramatically, and continues to do so, and negligence has been similarly transformed, the law dealing with wrongful interference with personal property remains, as if frozen in amber, a monument to the past.

Perhaps the reason is, in part, the absence of much academic activity in this sphere or, at least, the direction of scholarly interest that does exist. A legal subject typically attracts the attention of a whole spectrum of viewpoints, ranging from historical development to future evolution. Scholarly works dealing with wrongful interference with personal property mainly stress the fascinating details of its history. Few express any interest in directions for its improvement.

C. Conclusion

The law governing wrongful interference with goods, with all of its inconsistencies, gaps, redundancies and curiosities, is no longer serving us well. It is true that courts can often overlook the baggage of the centuries and arrive at fair, reasonably straightforward solutions to legal disputes. Even so, the defects of the law rise up often enough to cause mischief and injustice. We are far removed from the judicial and social context in which the features of the law last made sense. There is a need to review and update the relevant legal principles and clear away the sometimes baffling encrustations of earlier times. It is our conclusion that legislation should be enacted to restate the principles of the law that apply when there is a wrongful interference with personal property. The details of this legislation are considered in the next Chapter.
CHAPTER V

REFORM: RECOMMENDATIONS AND DRAFT LEGISLATION

A. Introduction

This Chapter identifies the principles that should be embodied in revising legislation. In this task, we are assisted by the earlier work of the English Law Reform Committee1 that led to the enactment of the Torts (Interference With Goods Act) 1977, the Study Paper on Wrongful Interference with Goods published by the Ontario Law Reform Commission2 and the Report of the Law Reform Committee of South Australia on the Law of Detinue, Conversion and Trespass to Goods.3

B. Models For Reform

Sometimes revising legislation need only address a few issues, leaving most of the common law alone to be developed by the courts. At other times something more substantial is called for. Two basic approaches for a larger undertaking are available: one operates against the background of the current law; the other replaces it entirely.

Our study suggests that, for wrongful interference with goods, limited intervention is unlikely to accomplish very much. It is for this reason that England has adopted, and the O.L.R.C. Study Paper recommends the enactment of, detailed revising legislation.4

The English and the Ontario solutions take different approaches, but each attempts to retain some of the lessons of the current law. The English legislation recasts the common law torts by abolishing detinue and enlarging the sphere of conversion. What is interesting about this approach is that it mirrors the state of the law that existed in the eighteenth century, when the action of detinue was largely neglected.5

The O.L.R.C. Study Paper would retain all of the existing actions, reshaping them into a single

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1 The Committee’s Report (the English Report) was reviewed critically: see D.J. Bentley, “A New-Found Haliday: The Eighteenth Report of the Law Reform Committee (Conversion and Detinue),” (1972) 35 M.L.R. 171; but the legislation based on it was well received. The legislation implemented the Committee’s recommendations only to a very limited extent: Brazier, Street on Torts, (8th ed., 1989) 34.

2 Supra, Chapter I, n. 2.


4 The English legislation is in Appendix A. The draft suggested in the OLRC Study Paper is in Appendix B.

5 And before Fouldes v. Willoughby had drawn back the borders of conversion. See supra, Chapter II, n. 37, and Chapter III, n. 14; see also Wilbraham v. Snow, (1669) Wms. Saund. 47a.
tort of wrongful interference with goods. Essentially, the legislation builds on the current law. Any action brought for wrongful interference will provide the same remedies that exist at common law as well as any additional remedies provided under the legislation.

While there are differences between these two approaches, at heart they attempt to give effect to the same policy: the conceptual unification of the torts.

An approach considered but rejected in both England and Ontario is the complete replacement of the common law with a statutory tort. The O.L.R.C. Study Paper discussed the issue in these terms:

All of this raises the question of whether the law might not be simplified and made more accessible. We considered a number of proposals. One, to which initially we were very attracted, was the creation of a new cause of action for wrongful interference with goods. Depending upon the characteristics of the claimant's case there would be various forms of relief available: various forms of specific relief, various measures of damages. The existing nominate torts would be swept away, and the conceptual unity of the law in this area would be emphasized.

The Law Reform Committee in its Eighteenth Report considered just such a proposal. They rejected it for reasons which seem to us to be sound. The drafting of a statute like this would likely be very cumbersome indeed. To this we would add that it would seem to require a more complete inquiry into the field of personal property law than we or the English were able to accomplish. And it is unclear to us that such an inquiry would be warranted by the problems it might unearth.

Both England and Ontario seem to believe that a statutory tort must involve a comprehensive restatement of the law - in effect, codification. Codification is a difficult technical exercise. It is not clear, however, that either jurisdiction fully considered the case in favour of a statutory tort.

Retaining the general outlines of the law (and, in both the English and Ontario models, much more of the law than that) may seem the simplest route for reform, but it is a costly one. Problems can be expected from stating the law in a technical and outdated fashion (or resting it on such principles) in terms ordinary people find baffling and even legally trained people have tended to abandon. A statutory tort need not codify the existing law. There is more than a little that can be said in favour of a new start, where legislation restates the general principles to be applied, even if the new legislation fails to address every conceivable issue on which some sort of legal solution has been arrived at in the past eight hundred or so years.

As to the need for detailed legal research, when considering reform of any area of the law it often makes sense to deal with the existing principles as a whole. The law usually consists of rational policy choices and much of modern conduct and commerce will be carried out in reliance

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6 Section 1.
7 Section 3.
8 OLRC Study Paper, 35-6.
9 English Report, para. 32; see also the comments of the Law Reform Committee of South Australia (at 27), which favoured revising the existing nominate torts to remove anomalies and rationalize their operation.
on it. In these cases, more often than not, it is necessary to identify the current policy of the law, determine whether it remains valid and, if not, devise options for change.

Where, as with wrongful interference with goods, the whole of the law owes less to rational development than historical accident, is unfamiliar to most and largely ignored by lawyers and courts, the exercise seems hardly worthwhile. It makes more sense to start afresh, directly identify the policies that should be advanced by the law and assemble these into a rational structure in the form of draft legislation.  

C. General Principles

Our review of the existing law suggests that most of its complexity is unnecessary and arises from two structural elements. These are:

(a) employing a number of torts to deal with damage or loss arising from an interference with property. This feature emphasizes the differences among various related actions rather than their similarities;

(b) providing largely inflexible remedies that are selected by a technical process of channelling. The appropriate remedy is picked by reference to the nature of the person’s interest that is harmed, the nature of the wrong, and the degree of loss it causes. Modern law no longer depends upon a formal channelling process to select a remedy. Instead, courts usually enjoy some flexibility in settling on an appropriate remedy.

These are the main concerns new legislation must address. They suggest that revising legislation must be based on four general principles:

(a) Remedies should be made available through a single cause of action,

(b) The action should be available to anyone with an interest in the property,

(c) Damage awards should compensate for a claimant’s actual loss, and

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10 In our work, we have encountered other areas of the law where it has seemed pointless to base reform on a detailed analysis of the existing legal principles: see, e.g., Report on Distress for Rent (LRC 53, 1981). This is usually true of areas of the law which have lain dormant, ignored or largely unchanged for a century or more. It is also these areas of the law which the courts are least able to handle. Legal principles plucked from the nineteenth century are often too difficult to deal with because we no longer understand the social or legal context in which they were developed. In these cases, the courts see their task solely as identifying the legal principle, not its policy rationale. Legal principles are accepted at face value.

11 It is not unusual to find areas of the law which, while technically still alive, are largely ignored. In B.C., e.g., the Commercial Tenancy Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c.54 has numerous provisions which, if applied, would produce unreasonable results. Many of its provisions are indecipherable. There is a need to replace the legislation, but only because it no longer does any good in its current form. It is not causing much mischief, however, because its provisions are entirely ignore. See Report on the Commercial Tenancy Act (LRC 108, 1989).
(d) The courts should be able to select from a full range of remedies.

1. A SINGLE TORT

First, at the highest level of generality, no purpose is served by fragmenting the various causes of action. A single, statutory tort devised to deal with any wrongful interference with property would allow similar situations to be resolved by reference to a common, and consistently applied, set of legal rules. The statutory tort, consequently, could provide a remedy in any case that a person directly or indirectly interfered with property wrongfully, such as by stealing it, disposing of or damaging it, or refusing to return it to a person entitled to have it. No purpose is served here by distinguishing between classes of wrongs relating to interference with personal property, a source of much of the bewildering complexity of the current law.

2. AVAILABLE TO ANYONE WITH AN INTEREST IN THE PROPERTY

From this position, it follows that anyone with an interest in the property, who has suffered loss as a result of another’s actions, should be entitled to a remedy under the new statutory tort. This is the second principle that should shape the new legislation. The need to distinguish between the kinds of interests a plaintiff may have (actual possession, a right to possession, future or residual rights, interrupted possession, or proprietary rights)¹² arises only when the court must choose an appropriate remedy. Not everyone, for example, should be entitled to the return of property, and the size of a damage award will depend upon how great an interest the plaintiff had in the goods.

Nothing is accomplished by distinguishing between classes of interest to determine who can bring the action. The nature of the interest will determine the remedy, not the route by which the claim is brought before the court.

3. COMPENSATION LIMITED TO ACTUAL LOSS

The approaches to assessing damages that the common law actions currently apply should be abandoned in favour of modern methods for determining compensation. Consequently, the third principle is that damages should be measured as the actual loss suffered by the claimant. The

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¹² The significance of the type of interest a plaintiff has is discussed in detail in Chapter II. For the most part, only a possessory or proprietary interest will support a remedy. Rights of recovery are usually subject to a rule (sometimes called the “bright line rule”) that persons with contractual rights with the owner of property cannot sue a tortfeasor for loss arising by reason of harm the wrongdoer caused to the property. See, e.g., Leigh & Sullivan Ltd. v. Aliakman Shipping Co. Ltd., [1986] 2 All E.R. 145 (H.L.), where a person with a contractual right to, but no property in, goods damaged in transit was denied a remedy. In C.N.R. v. Norsk Pacific Steamship Co., [1992] 1 S.C.R. 1021, three members of the panel decided that a person with a contractual right to use a bridge could, in the circumstances, recover compensation for economic loss caused when the bridge was damaged so that it could not be used (limiting factors were variously identified in terms of foreseeability, proximity, remoteness, special relationship between the plaintiff and the owner of the bridge, and the extend of the obligation to self-insure). Consequently, future courts may be more prepared to recognize that some kinds of non-possessory or non-proprietary rights in personal property, if interfered with, will support a claim for compensation by analogy to the principles that apply when a possessory or propriety interest is involved. Revising legislation should be careful not to foreclose such developments.
4. A FULL RANGE OF REMEDIES

Lastly, the courts should have sufficient flexibility to provide an appropriate remedy in the circumstances. Consequently, new legislation should empower the courts to grant one or more remedies from a comprehensive list.

Compensating for actual loss is only one of the functions of an award of damages. Damages can be used for other purposes, to discourage certain conduct or punish those whose actions are high handed or unconscionable. The court should have a full discretion to make an appropriate award of punitive, exemplary or aggravated damages, even in circumstances where a person with an interest in the property has suffered no actual loss. Such an approach ensures that the law is able to provide an adequate remedy in any case where a person interferes wrongfully with another’s property.

In addition to awarding damages, the court should be able to order the return of the property. In some cases, all that will be required is a declaration as to rights of ownership or possession (including the possibility that one person should hold the property in trust for others). In other cases, in order to untangle the various interests people have in property, it will be necessary to sell the property and divide the proceeds, in a fashion similar to the process by which land is partitioned when a dispute arises among co-owners.\[15\]

Conversion currently operates as a kind of forced sale. The wrongdoer is responsible for the whole of the value of the personal property and, upon paying that amount, becomes the owner of the goods. There will continue to be circumstances where this is a useful solution to a dispute. The court, consequently, should also have power to transfer ownership of property.

Some kinds of orders need not be listed in new legislation because the court is fully empowered to make them as a general matter. For example, a court can order the return of property before trial, perhaps requiring security to be posted, under the Rules of Court.\[16\] In some cases, all

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13 This approach resolves a number of issues. E.g., currently a bailee may bring an action and recover the whole of the loss. The bailee would be under an obligation to account to the owner, but the owner may be without a remedy if the bailee absconds with the money or becomes bankrupt. The statutory tort would allow anyone affected by the wrongdoer’s actions to join in the proceedings.

14 Aggravated damages are compensatory: Vorvis v. I.C.B.C., [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1085. The term “punitive damages” refers to those kinds of damages that are designed to punish, or demonstrate society’s disapproval of particularly high handed or immoral acts. The court will not award punitive damages where there has already been a sanction for criminal conduct: Rioux v. Smith, (1983) 48 B.C.L.R. 126 (c.a.). See also B.(A.) v. J.(I.), (1991) Alta. L.R. (2d) 81 (Q.B.).

15 See further Report on Co-Ownership of Land (LRC 100, 1988).

that is needed is an order that the defendant stop interfering with the property. A court can order an injunction as part of its general equitable jurisdiction.

5. SUMMARY

It is not a difficult task to identify the primary features of a new statutory tort to replace the existing common law actions. Moreover, starting afresh, it is clear that the outlines of the statutory tort need not be complex. Defining the general principles that should apply in precise enough terms will allow the courts to begin again in determining legal rights and remedies, suitable for contemporary social and commercial needs.

D. Specific Issues

1. RELATIONSHIP WITH NEGLIGENCE

The law of negligence has developed extensively during this century. The common law actions once served to provide a remedy in many cases where the wrongdoer’s actions were inadvertent, but today these cases are more often dealt with under the head of negligence. The law now tends to distinguish between intentional and inadvertent harm. While some commentators suggest that the line is firm, there is authority in British Columbia which holds that the common law personal property actions continue to apply equally in negligence.¹⁷

Should the statutory cause of action apply in situations addressed by the law of negligence? Even if the legislation were drafted to carefully delineate the boundaries between the statutory tort and negligence, as a matter of careful practice the plaintiff will ordinarily claim remedies under both. Our view is that this issue is not one that is unduly troubling. Little if anything is to be gained by attempting to minimize overlap between the statutory tort and negligence. Comment received on the Working Paper supported this position. It was agreed that new legislation should specifically provide that nothing in it affects the law of negligence. A suggestion was also made that revising legislation should clearly state that it does not limit or affect any other areas of the law (such as the law of trusts). The draft legislation set out later in this Chapter has been prepared with this in mind (see section 54).

2. THIRD PARTY INTERESTS, DEFENCES AND REPRESENTATIVE ACTIONS

The prohibition against defending on the basis that another person has an interest in the goods is not one that needs to be carried forward in new legislation. A defendant must be able to raise the interests of others to determine the correct award of damages. Courts have little difficulty in sorting out rights and remedies where there is more than one plaintiff or defendant. Legislation should allow a defendant to defend on the basis that someone else has an interest in the property (and join such a person as a third party to the proceedings).

¹⁷ See the discussion supra, Chapter II, n. 21.
(a) if the defendant’s actions were authorized by the third party who, if the third party had performed the act, would have had a defence against the plaintiff’s action; or

(b) if the third party also would have a claim against the defendant for the same wrong.

Of course, a defendant should not be able to escape liability solely because more than one person has an interest in the property.

The possibility of multiple interests in property also raises additional problems for a claimant when deciding how to proceed. It was concluded earlier that an award of damages should be measured by the extent of the loss the claimant has suffered. If there is more than one person with an interest in the property, one of three different approaches might be adopted to take into account the additional interests:

(a) The claimant could recover an amount based on the claimant’s interest;

(b) The claimant could recover on behalf of all those having interests in the affected property;

(c) Other persons having interests in the property could be added to the action as plaintiffs or third parties.

We have no difficulty with letting a claimant decide which option to pursue. Where the claimant proceeds on behalf of others, the court can make an appropriate order to protect their positions. A portion of the award, for example, could be impressed with a trust.

Sometimes it may not be clear whether others have an interest in the property. Where the plaintiff is awarded damages on the assumption the plaintiff is the sole owner of the property, it is our conclusion that the defendant’s liability should be limited to the judgment given in the first action even if the defendant does not raise in the first action the possibility that others might have interests in the property.

Are special rules needed to deal with representative actions? The Rules of Court already address two kinds of representative actions: where one person represents others with identical interests and where a trustee represents beneficiaries of the trust. Rule 5 provides:

...  

(11) Where numerous persons have the same interest in a proceeding, other than a proceeding referred to in subrule (17), the proceeding may be commenced and, unless the court otherwise orders, continued by or against one or more of them as representing all or as representing one or more of them.

...  

(17) A proceeding may be brought by or against trustees or personal representatives without joining a person having a beneficial interest in the trust or estate and, unless the court otherwise orders on the ground that the trustees or personal representatives could not or did not represent the
interest of that person, an order granted or made in the proceeding is binding on that person.

(18) Subrule (17) does not limit the power of the court to order a person having an interest to be made a party or to make an order under subrule (14).

Rules 5(17) and (18) satisfactorily address any problems that may arise where there are equitable interests involved. The Rules relating to other representative actions, however, are incomplete since they only operate when all parties have the same interest in the proceeding (Rule 5(11)). Often, in cases dealing with wrongful interference with goods, the interests of those in the property will not be identical: one may be an owner, another might have a lease, another might have had limited rights of possession. Even where everyone involved is an owner, they may have unequal shares.

It would seem, consequently, that either a new rule should be added, or the legislation should specifically address the issue of a representative action where not all interests are identical. This is not an entirely alien concept. The Wills Variation Act, for example, provides:

18. (1) Where an action has been commenced on behalf of a person, it may be treated by the court as, and so far as regards the question of limitation shall be deemed to be, an action on behalf of all persons who might apply.

Legislation along these lines should provide a suitably flexible response. A court, alerted by the defendant or the plaintiff about other possible interests in the property can make an appropriate order.

3. CO-OWNERS

Suppose property is disposed of or destroyed. Does it matter whether the wrongdoer is a stranger or someone who also has an interest in the property?

One might guess that it would make no difference. An innocent co-owner who suffers loss as a result of the action of another co-owner should be entitled to a remedy. The law, however, does not fully agree with the proposition. The innocent co-owner is entitled to a remedy if the property is damaged or a sale successfully transfers the innocent co-owner’s interest to another. But no remedy is available if

(a) one co-owner deprives another of possession and refuses to return the property, nor if

(b) a co-owner purports to sell the property to another, but the transaction is ineffective to transfer the innocent co-owner’s interest.

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18 R.S.B.C. 1979, c.435, s.8.

19 The court is prepared to take into account the interests of persons who are not a party to the proceedings involving tort claims: see, e.g., Wells v. McBrine, (1988) 33 B.C.L.R. (2d) 86 (C.A.).

Some of these legal principles appear to be borrowed from the law dealing with land.\textsuperscript{21} Co-owners of land are considered to each have full rights of possession. No one is entitled to exclusive possession of a part of the co-owned land. If B and C co-own land, B can’t forbid C from occupying all or part of it, and is only entitled to legal redress if C prevents B from entering the land at all.

By analogy, co-owners of personal property have similar rights of possession. B cannot complain if C has possession of the property, because C as a co-owner is entitled to its possession. Only if C’s actions amount to a kind of ouster by, for example, destroying the personal property, will B have a remedy.\textsuperscript{22}

The position regarding attempted sales of property has another explanation. It is a legal principle that a seller can convey no more than the seller has. If one co-owner attempts to sell co-owned property, the sale is usually effective to convey only that owner’s interest. Other co-owners, consequently, lose nothing because the “sale” can’t affect their interests.\textsuperscript{23} They cannot recover the property from the purchaser, however, because as a new co-owner the purchaser is equally entitled to possession.\textsuperscript{24}

It has been forcefully argued that this aspect of the law requires amendment.\textsuperscript{25} The analogy with co-ownership of land is a false one. For one reason, possession by one co-owner may very well amount to a total frustration of another’s rights in the property.\textsuperscript{26} Moreover, the law fails to provide a remedy in the situation where it is probably most needed.\textsuperscript{27}

It is submitted, from the point of view of protecting purchasers at large, that there is more reason for permitting a co-owner to sue his companion in trover than there is when only strangers are involved. So many times a co-owner may carry with him all the indicia of absolute title to a chattel by way of documents, receipts, etc., which might not be available to a fraudulent stranger purporting to sell such a chattel. Surely, if a wronged co-owner is to be given a remedy against anyone, it is better that he should be permitted to recover his damages from the person with whom he has been in legal relations and who is the real wrong-doer, rather than from a purely innocent and surprised stranger who purchased in good faith from a co-owner?

In our view, co-ownership should not be the bar to relief it currently represents, and revising

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{21} D.P. Derham, “Conversion by Wrongful Disposal as between Co-owners,” (1952) 68 L.Q.R. 507, 511. See further Report on Co-Ownership of Land, supra, n. 15.
\item \textsuperscript{22} Rourke v. Union Ins. Co., (1894) 23 S.C.R. 344.
\item \textsuperscript{23} There are a few exceptions where a purchaser can acquire complete title. See, supra, Chapter II, n. 57.
\item \textsuperscript{25} D.R. Derham, supra, n. 21.
\item \textsuperscript{26} It is also anomalous that an ineffective sale is a defence if a co-owner sells the property, but no defence if the sale is by a stranger.
\item \textsuperscript{27} D.R. Derham, supra, n. 21 at 511.
\end{itemize}
legislation should make that clear. But even more than this, there is a need for legislation to provide a means of unravelling disputes between co-owners. Some of these disputes will involve third parties. Others will emerge entirely from a deadlock of owners’ views about using the property.

Disagreements like these may have no solutions if the co-owners are unprepared to cooperate with each other. Another part of land law provides a useful model for dealing with these kinds of disagreements. Disputes between co-owners are resolved by applying for partition of property (or sale of the property and partition of the proceeds).\(^{28}\) The legislation creating these rights for co-owners of land does not apply to those who own personal property,\(^{29}\) but in our view this would be an equally useful procedure where ownership of personal property is shared. Comment on the Working Paper supported this position. It was suggested in one response that revising legislation should state that a court could, where appropriate, order the sale of the property to one of the co-owners (an option not currently available where the dispute concerns co-owned land). We agree this would be a useful refinement.

Should any limits be placed on when one co-owner is entitled to relief because of the actions of another co-owner? Some conduct, objectionable by a stranger, is entirely consistent with a co-owner’s property rights. Not every exclusive use of the co-owned property, for example, should entitle another co-owner to damages.

Probably the reformulation of damage principles suggested earlier provides a complete answer. A co-owner is entitled to recover compensation for actual loss. Any award of damages would be limited by the extent of the co-owner’s interest, and it would also seem to follow that co-ownership of particular kinds of property must implicitly allow for limited exclusive use which would not give rise to damages.\(^{30}\) Moreover, even if a claimant brings a proceeding which only claims damages, nothing would prevent a court from granting a more appropriate remedy, such as partition or sale of the property.

4. INNOCENT PARTIES

The common law torts are remorseless. Someone who acts innocently may be liable for losses caused an owner of property, even where the person has been duped by another who is the real perpetrator of the wrong. For example, B buys property from C not knowing that it is D’s property. B becomes a converter as soon as the property is delivered.\(^{31}\) An auctioneer who conducts a sale of

\(^{28}\) Report on Co-Ownership of Land, supra, n. 15.


\(^{30}\) E.g., a request for the return of the property could be properly refused by a co-owner and not justify an award of damages for wrongfully detaining the property.

property put up by someone other than the owner is a converter, on delivery of the property.\textsuperscript{32} In some cases, a carrier, or agent, acting on behalf of another, may also be liable in conversion. The common law test has been framed as follows:\textsuperscript{33}

\ldots one who deals with goods at the request of the person who has the actual custody of them, in the \textit{bona fide} belief that the custodian is the true owner, or has the authority of the true owner, should be excused for what he does if the act is of such a nature as would be excused if done by the authority of the person in possession, if he was a finder of the goods or intrusted with their custody \ldots A warehouseman with whom goods have been deposited is guilty of no conversion by keeping them, or restoring them to the person who deposited them with him, though that person turns out to have had no authority from the true owner.

The American Restatement adopts the position that an agent who both negotiates an acquisition or disposition of property, and completes the transaction (by receiving or delivering the property, as the case may be) is liable in conversion. But one who does only one or the other - only negotiates, or only completes the transaction - is not liable.\textsuperscript{34} Similarly, a bailee, agent or employee who receives or redelivers property, unaware that a third party has the right to immediate possession, is free from liability.

The O.L.R.C. Study Paper also provides a defence for innocent handlers based on an objective test. It is available to

\begin{enumerate}
\item[(a)] persons who reasonably believe they are acquiring valid interests, or
\item[(b)] persons who reasonably believe they are acting under the authority of someone with a valid interest.\textsuperscript{35}
\end{enumerate}

It is not clear to us that legislation needs to set down a fixed rule for resolving these kinds of issues. Legislation could instead empower the courts, as a discretionary matter, to relieve any person who acts honestly and reasonably from liability. A distinction should probably be drawn between acting innocently and acting foolishly or recklessly, but these are factors that a court would naturally weigh when considering whether to exercise its discretion. Such a discretion would operate in much the same fashion as the discretion to relieve a trustee from a breach of trust.\textsuperscript{36} It would allow the court to relieve a person from liability to pay damages. The defence, however, would not allow a court to leave the defendant in possession of the claimant’s property. The court can balance the interests of the parties involved and examine their actions. We prefer this alternative, as did those who commented on the Working Paper.

\begin{itemize}
\item[33] \textit{Hollins v. Fowler}, (1875) L.R. 7 H.L. 757, 766-7, \textit{per} Blackburn J.
\item[34] Ss. 231 and 233.
\item[35] Or who is acquiring a valid interest. Like the test set out in \textit{Hollins v. Fowler, supra}, n. 33 the interest referred to must, if it had existed, justify the wrong complained of.
\item[36] \textit{Trustee Act}, R.S.B.C. 1979, c.414. s.98.
\end{itemize}
5. RETURN OF PROPERTY TO ONE WHO DOES NOT HAVE AN IMMEDIATE RIGHT OF POSSESSION

Allowing any person with an interest in property to bring an action, in which the court may select from a list of orders, may raise some difficult problems. Sometimes the plaintiff will not have an immediate right to possess the property (the owner who has leased the property to another for six months, for example). What is the court to do if the person entitled to possession does not take part? The O.L.R.C. Study Paper suggests that the court should be able to give possession to a person even if the person does not have an immediate right to it. We think this is correct in principle, although we see no need to address the matter in a separate section of legislation. Provided the legislation empowers the court to declare rights of possession, and direct who is to have possession, there is sufficient flexibility to settle upon an appropriate order. Much can be left to the good sense of our judges.

6. PERSONAL PROPERTY SECURITY LEGISLATION

One correspondent was concerned about the interface between the Personal Property Security Act (“PPSA”) and the new legislation in connection with the enforcement of security agreements by lenders. Part 5 of the PPSA deals comprehensively with rights a lender has with respect to security. It would be unfortunate if new legislation affected the PPSA, a statute which is intended to be a complete statement of the rules for dealing with disputes about property that arise in secured transactions.

Another problem seems to arise from a section contained in the PPSA which purports to retain the common law and equity to the extent that it is unchanged by the PPSA:

68. (1) The principles of the common law, equity and the law merchant, except insofar as they are inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, supplement this Act and continue to apply.

This section seems to preserve the common law in a form unchanged by the operation of any other legislation. If so, new legislation designed to modernize and simplify the common law torts dealing with rights in personal property will be ineffective to the extent that the issues concern security interests. So far as we are able to discover, the section has not yet received judicial consideration and we do not believe a court would interpret it in that fashion. A more likely interpretation would be that the section preserves rights (as they exist at common law, including any modifications introduced by statute) that arise separately from the PPSA but which are not inconsistent with it. To hold otherwise would have the effect of importing vast chunks of obsolete law into the operation of modern personal property security legislation. Those involved in commerce are unlikely to find this a sensible or practical approach to dealing with contemporary legal issues, and it is difficult to believe that the legislature intended such a consequence.

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37 S.B.C. 1991, c.36.

38 This interpretation is reinforced by s.73 of the PPSA, which provides that if there is a conflict between the PPSA and any other Act, the PPSA prevails unless the other Act provides that it applies notwithstanding the PPSA.
In our view, consequently, to the extent the new legislation is not inconsistent with the PPSA, it should supplement the PPSA and apply to secured transactions. However, we also concluded earlier that there is no need to abolish the common law actions. Consequently, any lender who finds it appropriate to do so is free to ignore the new legislation and rely upon the common law.

It is difficult to envisage problems being produced by the new legislation where a lender seeks to exercise rights against the security. The new legislation can only enhance the rights of the secured lender, because section 73 of the PPSA removes any possibility of a conflict between it and other legislation:

39. Subject to section 74, if there is a conflict between this Act and any other Act, this Act prevails unless the other Act contains an express provision that it, or a provision of it, applies notwithstanding the Personal Property Security Act.

It is also worth observing that the draft legislation circulated in the Working Paper expressly recognized contractual arrangements between an owner of property, and a lender who has security in it. Thus the security agreement itself, which grants rights to realize on the security, should ensure that no conflict can arise between the operation of the new revising legislation and the terms under which the security was arranged.

If any problem can be anticipated at all, it is the possibility that a borrower might attempt to use the new legislation to inconvenience the lender after the lender has seized the collateral. Even in that case, a court should not be misled about the proper operation of the new legislation (the draft in the Working Paper, for example, only provided a remedy where a person acted “without legal justification” and the obligation to return property was predicated on a request by an owner “entitled to the possession of the property” and even that obligation was subject to modification by the “consent” or “agreement” of the owner).

Nevertheless, we recognize the concerns of the secured lender and think that it is appropriate, out of an abundance of caution, to ensure that such a result would not be possible. These problems, it is our conclusion, can be addressed by providing that the new legislation does not affect rights between a secured lender and an owner of property after the secured lender seizes the security.

7. OTHER ISSUES

A review of any standard text reveals that issues arising in the context of wrongful interference with goods are plentiful. The draft legislation set out in the next section addresses most of these matters - often simply by identifying a general guiding principle. The draft legislation is annotated, which is, perhaps, the most efficient method of describing its anticipated operation. (The reader may wish to compare the suggested legislation with the more detailed English statute and the proposed Ontario Act. These are set out in Appendices A and B.)

8. DRAFT PROPERTY LAW AMENDMENT ACT

39 E.g., the new legislation would seem to provide a more direct response than the current law to the kinds of situations discussed by Cuming and Wood at p. 340 of the B.C. PPSA Handbook.
It is our recommendation that legislation be enacted that embodies the principles of the draft legislation set out below.

HER MAJESTY, by and with the advice and consent of the Legislative Assembly of the Province of British Columbia, enacts as follows:

1. The *Property Law Act*, R.S.B.C., 1979, c. 340, is amended by adding the following as a heading after [section 49]:

   The legislation could take the form of a separate Act. However, the *Property Law Act* also seems to be a sensible location. That Act now deals with land. We have also recommended that it be amended to add a new Part 2 dealing with co-ownership of land and partition and sale of land. This draft contemplates a new Part 3, applying to personal property. The section number begins at s.50, leaving room for the new sections recommended in *Report on Co-Ownership of Land* (LRC 100, 1988).

PART 3
PERSONAL PROPERTY

2. The following sections are added:

Definitions

50. In this Part

“interest” includes any right in or to property.

Currently, the nature of the interest determines the kind of action that can be brought. *E.g.*, only someone with possession can bring an action for trespass to chattels. A person with a reversionary interest must bring an action on the case. Under the draft legislation, anyone with an interest can bring an action. The defendant is protected by the principle that damages may be awarded to the extent that they are attributable to the interest of an owner who is not a party to the action. See s.52(2)(b).

A person with an equitable interest may bring an action or the matter might be pursued by the person who holds the legal interest. Often, the interests of the two are in conflict. *E.g.*, a person who borrows money and gives the lender a mortgage against personal property retains only an equitable interest in the property. If the property is damaged, each has a separate claim that may be brought under this legislation.

“owner” means a person with an interest,

Self-explanatory. “Interest” is defined.

“property” means

(a) tangible personal property and includes
(i) money,
(ii) a document representing an interest in tangible personal property, and
(iii) identifiable property received in exchange, or as a substitute, for the original property, and

(b) a document representing an interest in intangible personal property.

The usual view is that the common law actions are unavailable where the property involved is money, although remedies are available in equity. But there is no reason why the draft legislation should not provide a remedy where, *e.g.*, money is stolen.

The definition of property also includes substitutes for the original. In this way, a claimant can also look to, *e.g.*, money received by a wrongdoer who sells the property.

The definition does not include intangible personal property, such as choses in action, nor property affixed to land. The current law makes similar distinctions. Documents of title, however, are included. Interference with the paper that represents an interest in tangible or intangible property - such as ripping up a winning lottery ticket, for example, or a cheque - can cause loss equal to interference with the property itself.

Wrongful Interference With Property

51. (1) A person, with respect to property owned by another, must not interfere with, or harm, directly or indirectly

Trepass to chattels provides a remedy where property is damaged. Conversion deals with serious damage (which amounts to depriving the owner of property rights) or where a person refuses to return the goods. Detinue also deals with wrongfully detained goods, but provides the alternative remedy of the return of the goods.

The draft legislation replaces the need for the common law actions with a single cause of action. The new cause of action will operate consistently, smoothing out the historical oddities that exist in the current law. Some thought was given to abolishing the common law actions, since the statutory action will be a complete replacement. However, there is some risk that a person who pleads incorrectly might be left without a remedy. The draft legislation will be used instead of the common law actions. They will become as obsolete as other actions - like assumpsit - overtaken by modern remedies.

The section deals with intentional acts as well as negligence, embracing the same kinds of behaviour as the common law torts.

The language used to describe interference with property is broad enough to embrace any kind of dealing, even where the wrongdoer, *e.g.*, does not come into contract with the property but acts through another. The usual categories of interference are dispossession of another of property, detaining property, disposing of property and destroying property.

The reference to “owned” triggers the definition of owner: *see the Interpretation Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c.206, s.28(4).*
Part of merging of the actions requires that the statutory remedy protect both the personal property and rights in it. That is accomplished by paragraphs (a) and (b).

In most cases, a person who holds property belonging to another must take care of it. This is a requirement of the current law, and the policy is carried forward in the draft legislation.

Subsection (2) deals with two kinds of situations: where a person comes into the possession of property by agreement or in some other way. The subsection requires that property be protected, and returned upon request. The requirement for return on request is expressed in absolute terms, but the corresponding common law duty allows the holder to make reasonable enquiries as to who owns the property, and whether there is any reason - such as settling a bill for the property’s storage - to retain the property temporarily. There is no reason why the courts need to depart from the approach under the statutory model, particularly since the holder will be liable if possession of the property is released to the wrong person. See s.51(3).

In some cases, the arrangement will be governed by contract. In other cases, obligations will vary by reference to how the holder acquired the property: by finding, e.g., or perhaps a formal arrangement of bailment.

The law of bailment is complex. Obligations vary depending on the manner in which property is received. Some aspects of the relationship between bailor and bailee are protected by the common law actions dealing with personal property. The statutory remedy will also serve this purpose. It is important to realize, however, that this legislation only peripherally affects the law of bailment, which is an amalgam of statute, contract, trade custom, and rights that arise from the bailment itself.

The holder of the property is only responsible for intentional or negligent acts that cause harm to the owner’s property.
In some cases, the holder of the property will be under no obligation, or the extent of the obligation will be altered. The parties, e.g., can agree between themselves on the standards that are to apply. In some cases, the owner's conduct will be officious or overbearing and no duty will arise. E.g., unsolicited goods received in the mail would not be subject to the obligations outlined in this section, by reason of the owner's conduct. Similarly, a secured creditor that seizes the security would be under no obligation to return it (except in accordance with the security agreement).

A sheriff who seizes property in execution would not be under an obligation to deliver it to the owner for two reasons. First, the obligation would be excused by court order, provided the seizure was lawful. Second, an owner whose property has been seized in execution would not satisfy the condition under s.51(2) that the request be made by an owner entitled to possession. See, e.g., Bennett v. Ontario Provincial Police (1992) 32 A.C.W.S. (3d) 1168 (Ont. Ct. - Gen. Div.).

Orders

52. (1) Where a person is in breach of a duty imposed by section 51, an owner may bring a proceeding for relief under subsection (2).

(2) In proceeding under this section, the court may do one or more of the following:

(b) declare the ownership of, or right of possession to, the property,
(c) award damages for reasonably foreseeable loss or injury arising from the breach of duty except to the extent that the person against whom relief is claimed can establish that the loss sustained, or part of it, is to the interest of an owner who is not a party to the action.

Under the current law, one measure of damages is the whole of the value of the property. This is inflexible and, moreover, leaves the defendant at some risk, since where there are multiple claimants they may be able to recover several times over. Under the draft legislation, an owner must prove the actual loss arising from damage to the property or interference with possession. The common law limits the circumstances in which a defendant of another person in the property (called the jus tertii). This section reverses the rule. The owner’s claim is limited to the extent that other interests have been damaged by the wrongdoer’s actions (although the responsibility of establishing that there are other owners is on the defendant.) However, a claimant can recover on behalf of others: see paragraph (g).

(d) award damages for profit earned by a person by reason of the breach of duty,

This concept is currently dealt with by the law in a restitutionary context. The process is called “waiver of tort” since, in a sense, the owner is ratifying the wrong and treating the wrongdoer as an agent, in order to recover the profit. The draft legislation avoids this fiction and allows the court to make an award of damages to recover profit where that is appropriate.

(e) award aggravated, exemplary or punitive damages,

Technical terms to describe damages over and above an award aimed at compensating a claimant are not entirely fixed. “Aggravated” may cover the field, although some cases distinguish between aggravated damages (as being compensatory) as exemplary damages which serve different functions, such as punishing the wrongdoer. Since there are gradations of meaning, the draft must use all three terms.

(f) order the return of the property,

At common law, only the action of detinue would allow the court to make an order for the return of the property. Under the draft legislation, it is an order the court can make whenever the wrongdoer retains the property, if such an order is appropriate in the circumstances. Should the legislation provide that preference should be given to such an order? Should it be left to the option of the plaintiff? Or the option of the defendant? All of these ideas have been considered at one time or another. The last, curiously enough, is the one adopted at common law. The draft legislation leaves the issue to the court’s discretion.
(g) order the sale of the property (or of other property where the original property has been mixed with it, added to it, or now forms a part of it) and distribution of the proceeds, and the sale may be to one or more owners or parties to the proceeding.

Perhaps there is more than one owner. An order for sale might be the best method of protecting the rights of all (including those who are not parties to the proceedings).

Property has an extended meaning and covers property substituted for the original. See the definitions. Paragraph (f) further provides that remedies extend to a mixture of the original property with other property.

The word “parties” is used as well as “owners”. The court can, where appropriate, order the sale to a party to the proceeding (someone who damaged the property, e.g., who is not an owner. The legislation, consequently, preserves one of the features of the law of conversion. The legislation refers to a sale to an “owner” to ensure that the section’s application is not unduly confined by analogy to partition and sale of real property, which does not allow the sale of property to an owner.

(h) of damages be held in trust for other persons with interests in the property,

This option, like paragraph (b), is also added to take into account the possibility that more than one person is an owner, but not necessarily a party to the proceedings. The court can treat the applicant’s claim as a representative one and make an appropriate order on behalf of those who are not present.

(i) compensate a person for improvements to the property, or expenses assumed maintaining or preserving the property.


(3) An order under this section may be subject to such terms and conditions, if any, as may be appropriate in the circumstances.

Self-explanatory.

(4) A court may relieve a person, either wholly or partly, from technical breaches need not always require a remedy. In some cases, a person may quite innocently intermeddle with another’s property. E.g., the wrongdoer may request a carrier to deliver the property to another. An auctioneer may, at the request of the wrongdoer, arrange for the sale of the property. In these cases, the Act provides the court with a discretion to relieve the person from liability. However, not every case of an innocent interference should be excused. The question of who should bear the loss - an owner or the person carrying out the wrong - will usually be answered by placing responsibility on the wrongdoer. Notice that the court’s discretion to repower under this section, e.g., to leave a third party in possession of property that still belongs to the claimant. This subsection will allow the court, on a discretionary basis, to consider matters like the contributory negligence of the claimant.
(a) liability to pay damages, or  
(b) an obligation to contribute where another must pay damages  

under this Part where the person acted honestly and reasonably.

Co-owners  

53. An owner is not disentitled to relief by reason only that the person against whom relief is sought is  

(b) also an owner, or  
(c) a person who acquired an interest through an owner.

Relationship With Other Areas of the Law  

54. Nothing in this Part affects or limits any existing rights of action an owner may have in negligence or otherwise for loss or damage to an interest in property caused by any other person.

Agreement  

55. Rights and obligations under this Part may be varied or waived by the agreement of the parties.

Representative Proceeding  

56. A proceeding under this Part may be treated by the court as, and so far as regards the question of limitation must be deemed to be, an action on behalf of all persons with interests in the property.
Amendments to the Limitation Act will be necessary to ensure that the policy of that Act continues to apply to proceedings relating to personal property. Briefly, the Limitation Act provides that where loss arises from damage caused to property, the limitation period is 2 years: s.3(1)(a). Where economic loss arises from a dealing in property which does not harm the property, the limitation period is six years: s.3(3). S.10 provides that where a series of further or new actions arise from an interference with goods, the limitation period is six years from the accrual of the first cause of action. Necessary amendments to the Limitation Act are dealt with in Appendix C.

E. Acknowledgments

A technical review of an area of law, such as that discussed in this Report, seldom attracts a great deal of comment. We are all the more grateful for those who took the time to consider and comment upon the Working Paper that preceded this Report. The criticism and advice we received was well considered and assisted us greatly in the preparation of this Report.

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APPENDIX C

CONSEQUENTIAL AMENDMENTS TO THE LIMITATION ACT

A. Introduction

The Limitation Act deals comprehensively with actions involving personal property. This is the structure the legislation applies:

- Loss arising from damage to personal property is subject to a two year limitation period: s. 3(1)
- Other claims relating to personal property (such as those aimed at recovering possession or involving questions of legal title) are subject to a six year limitation period: s. 3(5).
- Where an owner has lost possession of the goods, not only the claim is foreclosed when the limitation period expires. All rights in the goods are lost: s. 9.
- Where a series of further or new claims arise from an interference with personal property, they are subject to a single limitation period of six years from the accrual of the first cause of action: s. 10.

B. Strategy for Revising the Limitation Act

The Limitation Act implements recommendations made by the Commission in its 1974 Report on Limitations - General. The Commission’s goal in the current project has been to consider, and restate, the law relating to wrongful interference with personal property. Revisiting the law of limitations and rethinking policy in that area is not a necessary part of the process. Moreover, case law suggests that the Limitation Act is operating soundly for claims relating to personal property.

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1 R.S.B.C. 1979, c.236.
3 (LRC 15, 1974).
4 Recent issues do not challenge the policy of the legislation. More often than not, the question is simply selecting the appropriate limitation period for the particular cause of action: see, e.g., Harshenin v. Bayoff, (1991) 49 C.P.C. (2d) 55 (B.C.S.C.) (which considered whether claims for trespass, conversion, and damage to property could be postponed under the Act), and Sobota v. Kleider, (1986) 36 C.C.L.T. 79 (B.C.S.C.) (which considered the limitation period that should apply to an action in bailment). Problems like these will be resolved by legislation which restates the common law actions in terms of a single statutory action.
Nevertheless, even simply ensuring that current limitations policy continues to apply to the new statutory action recommended in this Report will require some revisions to the Limitation Act. The following is a list of parts of the Limitation Act that must be revised, and those parts that can be retained. Most of these revisions are made necessary by changes that will be introduced by the new legislation to the basic vocabulary describing proceedings that can be brought and available remedies:

- Some parts of the Act deal with the current law in generic terms. For the most part these provisions can remain unchanged.
- The parts of the Limitation Act retaining the language of the old actions must be changed.⁵
- Where the Limitation Act must make specific references to the statutory cause of action, it is sufficient to refer to the (new) Part 3 of the Property Law Act.

C. Draft Legislation

The changes suggested above are relatively straightforward to introduce into the Limitation Act: sections 3(1)(b), 3(5)(c) and 9 must be revised; section 3(5)(d) must be repealed without replacement; section 10 must be replaced with a new section; the remainder of section 3(1) and section 3(4) remain unchanged.

The following is one way of redrafting those portions of the Limitation Act that govern proceedings for wrongful interference with goods. Only a very few changes are needed to meet the objectives outlined in this Appendix. (In the following draft, the new portions are italicized and deletions are indicated by [smaller print in square brackets]):

3. (1) After the expiration of 2 years after the date on which the right to do so arose a person shall not bring an action

   (a) for damages in respect of injury to person or property, including economic loss arising from the injury, whether based on contract, tort or statutory duty;
   (b) for trespass to [property] land not included in paragraph (a);

3. (4) Any other action not specifically provided for in this Act or any other Act shall not be brought after the expiration of 6 years after the date on which the right to do so arose.

3. (5) Without limiting the generality of subsection (4) and notwithstanding subsections (1) and (3), after the expiration of 6 years after the date on which the right to do so arose an action shall not be brought

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⁵ Subsection 3(1)(a) and (4) of the Limitation Act will still deal with the existing common law actions. The Report does not suggest repealing the common law actions protecting rights in personal property. There is no need to do so. The new legislation will apply to causes of action arising after it comes into force. The old law will still serve for actions arising before the new legislation comes into force.
(c) [for damages for conversion or detention of goods] for relief under Part 3 of the Property Law Act where the claim for relief is not based on tangible physical injury to the property;

[(d) [for the recovery of goods wrongfully taken or detained;]]

9. (Section 9 sets out in column form the effect of the expiration of limitation periods on particular actions. The first line in column 1 reads “For conversion or detention of goods.” This can be modified satisfactorily by deleting the words “conversion or” since the essential idea is that a person detains an owner’s goods.)

[ 10. Where a cause of action for the conversion or detention of goods accrues to a person and afterwards, possession of the goods not having been recovered by him or by a person claiming through him,

(a) a further cause of action for the conversion or detention of the goods;
(b) a new cause of action for damage to the goods; or
(c) a new cause of action to recover the proceeds of a sale of the goods,

accrues to him or a person claiming through him, no action shall be brought on the further or new cause of action after the expiration of 6 years from the date on which the first cause of action accrued to the plaintiff or to a person through whom he claims.]

10. (1) Where under Part 3 of the Property Law Act a breach of duty forms the basis of a claim for relief and a further breach of duty occurs in relation to the same property, no action shall be brought for relief based on or arising out of the further breach of duty after the time limited for claiming relief based on the earlier breach of duty.

(2) Subsection (1) does not apply where

(a) any claim for relief is based on tangible physical injury to the property, or

(b) the person entitled to relief, between the original breach of duty and the further breach of duty, recovered possession of the property.