That underlying action concerned a dispute between brothers over control of “a group of four interrelated companies”. Prior to trial of that action, “The Applicant moves for an interlocutory injunction reinstating him as a director in relation to one of the companies, removing the Respondent as a director of all of the companies, instituting the Applicant as sole director of all of the companies, and ordering the return of all company equipment plus giving the Applicant full decision-making authority in relation to that equipment”.

There was a dispute over how to characterize the injunction sought by the applicant:

As noted by both parties, a significant issue in this case is whether the relief sought is mandatory or restraining/prohibitive. If it is mandatory, then the burden on the applicant is to prove that there is a serious prima facie case. If it is prohibitive then the lower burden of a serious issue to be tried applies.

The court resolved this dispute by characterizing the injunction as mandatory, for the following reasons:

The Applicant is asking that 1) the Respondent be removed as a director and officer of all four Beaumont Group companies and for the Applicant to be reinstated/instated as the sole director and officer of the Beaumont Group, and 2) that the equipment that belongs to the Beaumont Group be “returned to Beaumont”, that is, taken from the Bayne Street facility and moved to some undisclosed location at the sole direction of the Applicant. Contrary to the position of the Applicant, this a request for affirmative action and therefore for mandatory relief. As a result, the Applicant is held to the higher burden of proving a strong prima facie case.

Despite this finding, the applicant was able to meet the higher burden. But that still left two stages of the test for the court to consider.

And, as the court put it, “This application mainly rises and falls on this second issue”, which concerns irreparable harm. Here, the applicant wasn’t able to persuade the court that he would suffer irreparable harm in the absence of the injunction:

On the basis of the evidence presented on this application, there will be no irreparable harm if the injunction is denied. Any harm occasioned between now and a final determination at trial is compensable through monetary damages. On this second branch alone, the application fails.

The applicant also fell short on the third stage, which directs the court to consider the balance of convenience between the parties:

[33]         On the evidence presented on this application, granting the requested injunctive relief will not prevent more harm than it causes. . . .

[34]         In the present case, based on the evidence presented during this application, the “other” factors appear to be evenly balanced, therefore it is “a counsel of prudence” to take such measures as are calculated to preserve the status quo. The application fails on this third branch as well.

In the result, “The Applicant’s motion fails in relation to the second and third branch of the RJR test. His motion for an interlocutory injunction is denied”.

The post NS Supreme Court denies injunction despite finding applicant had a strong prima facie case first appeared on British Columbia Law Institute.