BC Supreme Court Finds Preserving Rule of Law “Paramount” in Walbran Valley Injunction Ruling
November 24, 2025
BY Marie Ong
In TsawakQin Forestry Limited Partnership v O’Connell, 2025 BCSC 1880, the British Columbia Supreme Court granted an interim injunction halting the efforts of a group of protestors who had blocked an access road near Carmanah Walbran Provincial Park on Vancouver Island. The blockade was constructed in protest to lumber harvesting activities by the plaintiffs, Tsawak-Qin Forestry Inc. and Tsawak-Qin Forestry Limited Partnership (collectively, “Tsawak-Qin”) and had prevented the plaintiffs and their contractors from accessing their harvest sites for the two weeks prior to the application.
Based on social media evidence, the court observed that the protestors appeared to be a well-organized, social media savvy group, and that many participants were the same individuals who had organized the “Fairy Creek Blockade”, a series of protests against old-growth logging in 2020 and 2021 that resulted in significant media attention and considerable litigation before the Supreme Court of BC. Despite the size of the group, only one protestor responded to the application.
The area in question lies within the traditional territory of the Pacheedaht First Nation (“PFN”). The court emphasized in this decision that the PFN had provided a letter of support with respect to the plaintiffs’ road permit and cutting permit and that Tsawak-Qin was acting legally in accordance with validly issued government permits.
Applying the RJR-MacDonald test, the court found that the plaintiffs had established all three factors necessary for the granting of an injunction:
- There was clearly a serious issue to be tried.
The decision highlighted that the defendants were alleged to have committed several torts which included trespass, nuisance, unlawful inference with economic relations, interference with contractual relations, intimidation, and conspiracy. The judge also noted that it appeared clear that the defendants’ actions were criminal in nature, as section 423(1)(g) of the Criminal Code makes it an offence to block or obstruct a highway. This factor was not in dispute as the one individual respondent conceded that there was a serious issue to be tried.
- The plaintiffs would suffer irreparable harm if the relief was not granted.
The court found the evidentiary record sufficient to establish irreparable harm.
The plaintiffs held a property right in the land (specifically, a profit á prendre, a non-possessory interest for the purpose of resource extraction) and the law presumes that interference with property rights constitutes irreparable harm.
The court appeared to also give significant weight to the economic loss the plaintiffs had suffered and would suffer if the blockade were to continue. Beyond immediate loss of revenue, the court noted that the plaintiffs were allowed to cut only a certain amount of timber annually and that if they harvested less than their authorized volume in 2025, that could impact the amount they would be allowed to cut in future years.
Additionally, safety risks were held to be relevant to this factor as the blockade prevented access to safety vehicles and hindered the ability to winterize the roads.
Lastly, the court found no reasonable prospect that the Tsawak-Qin could be made whole by way of damages. The defendants were mostly anonymous, and the potential damages would likely exceed the financial capacity of the defendant individuals.
- The balance of convenience favoured the granting of the relief
The sole responding defendant argued on this application that the court should consider the broader public interest in the preservation of old growth forests and battling climate change. The court rejected this submission, however, finding that this issue had been conclusively decided in previous cases such as Teal Cedar Products Ltd. v Rainforest Flying Squad. In that injunction decision, which related to the Fairy Creek Blockade, the Court of Appeal held that matters of government forest policy were exclusively within the authority of the provincial government and not for courts to weigh in on.
The court also dismissed arguments made by the individual defendant that section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms were invoked in this case since the Charter had no application in a private law dispute of this nature. Further, the court was not persuaded by the defendant’s argument that there was a duty to consult with him that was breached. The decision noted that the duty to consult exists to protect the collective rights of Indigenous people and that the PFN supported the activities of the plaintiffs.
In considering the balance of convenience factor, the court emphasized the central importance of upholding the rule of law:
[42] Counsel for Mr. Jones has made no effort to explain or suggest that the protestors’ conduct is legal. This is because it is illegal. The Court in such circumstances has no choice but to protect the lawful conduct and business of the plaintiff, and address the illegality of the defendants’ behaviour. The public’s interest in preserving the rule of law must be the paramount consideration on the balance of convenience analysis in a case like this.
In the result, the court granted the injunction.
