Injunction available to fill remedial gap in labour case: BC Court of Appeal
January 23, 2026
BY Kevin Zakreski
TELUS Communications Inc. v Telecommunications Workers Union, 2026 BCCA 5, was an appeal of a chambers judge’s decision, which “challenges an order granting an interim injunction against a federally regulated employer in the labour relations context. The injunction has since expired but legal questions arising from that proceeding will benefit from appellate consideration.”
As the court noted, “the appeal is focused on three discrete legal issues: a) Does a Supreme Court judge have jurisdiction to grant an interim injunction in the federal labour relations context before the appointment of an arbitrator? b) If an injunction is available, must it end the day an arbitrator is appointed? c) Is a judge obliged to require an undertaking as to damages?”
On the first issue, the court confirmed that the jurisdiction exists and affirmed the chambers judge’s decision on its availability in this case:
[24] The parties agree that in the federal labour relations context, superior courts retain a residual discretionary power to grant interlocutory relief where an adequate alternative remedy is not available. This power emanates from the courts’ inherent jurisdiction and in British Columbia, it finds form in the Law and Equity Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 253. . . .
[25] The Supreme Court of Canada affirmed the existence of a residual discretionary power in Canadian Pacific. . .
[26] Although the parties agree on the existence of this power, they disagree on whether the power was available in the circumstances of this case. . . .
[32] I agree with the judge that because the collective agreement at issue here allows for delay between the filing of a grievance and the appointment of an arbitrator, there is a remedial gap within the meaning of Canadian Pacific and the Supreme Court had jurisdiction to grant interim relief exercising its residual discretionary power. The plain fact is that until an arbitrator was in place, there was no tribunal in existence and available to the Union under the collective agreement or the statutory scheme that could grant the relief sought. As found by the judge, the Union’s affected members were facing the prospect of irreparable harm, and a forum was necessary to address that issue. With this practical reality, I do not find P.S.A.C. [2000 YTSC 20] (cited by TELUS) persuasive. It is unclear whether an arbitrator was in place at the time the bargaining agent in P.S.A.C. filed its application for interim relief; in any event, that decision is not binding on this Court.
[33] TELUS is correct to point out that s. 60(1)(a.2) of the Canada Labour Code filled the specific void identified in Canadian Pacific, namely, a factual scenario in which neither the collective agreement nor the “machinery provided under the Canada Labour Code” offered a jurisdictional path to secure the postponement of intended job changes: at para. 6. However, it is also the case that Canadian Pacific stands for a broader proposition. It holds that where there is a “possibility” events will produce a difficulty not foreseen by the collective agreement and the statutory scheme that govern a labour relations relationship. . . .
[34] In this case, the only “tribunal capable of resolving the matter” of irreparable harm at the time of the injunction application was the Supreme Court.
On the second and third issues, the court declined to reverse what were, in essence, discretionary decisions made by the chambers judge:
[39] However, crafting the terms of an injunction involves discretion and I would not find that standing alone, the two-month expiry date justifies appellate intervention. It is readily apparent the judge was alive to the interim nature of the remedy he granted, recognized that once an arbitrator was in place, the latter was the decision maker with “domain” over injunctive relief and TELUS could raise the issue with the arbitrator, and he included terms allowing for an amendment or earlier termination of the injunction by written agreement or a further court order: at paras. 55–60. This flexibility provided for the amelioration of prejudice at TELUS’ behest.
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[46] The judge’s discretionary decision to not require an undertaking attracts a deferential standard of review and cannot be overturned in the absence of TELUS establishing a material error of law or principle, or a palpable and overriding error of fact: Interfor Corporation v. Mackenzie Sawmill Ltd., 2022 BCCA 228 at para. 26.
[47] In my view, TELUS has not met this burden. The fact that another judge may have exercised their discretion differently does not mean this judge erred. On a functional and contextual review of the reasons for judgment, I am satisfied the judge did not misdirect himself on the law surrounding undertakings, misapprehend the record, fail to consider relevant factors, or wrongly emphasize one factor over another. Instead, as I interpret his reasons, he simply concluded that given the short duration of the interim injunction, the ability of TELUS to challenge the need for an injunction once before the arbitrator, and his direction that the proceedings be expedited, the usual approach taken to undertakings in the labour relations realm (a relevant consideration) was also appropriate here. This was an individualized assessment and TELUS has not displaced the deferential standard of review.
In the result, the appeal was dismissed.
